

DIPLMACY DIGEST

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Diplomacy Digest, which has been moribund for the past "few" months, is now dead. Folded. Kaput.

Of course, the problem with waiting this long is that most responses will be either a) hm, Diplomacy Digest, now where have I heard that name before? or b) why that dirty rat, he's been sitting on my money all this long.

So why did it take so long? It wasn't so much the desire to put out "one last great issue". I wanted to put out "The Tactics of Diplomacy". Parts of it were already typed, and nearly all of it was already written. But actually finishing it at a time when I no longer wish to publish was another matter entirely. I kept saying I'd get back to it, but of course, "everything" else came ahead of it. And the idea of typing that huge section on Stalemate Lines was just so unappetizing. However, the computer (a Macintosh Performa 600CD) has eased the typing burden. And I have another publishing project that I want to do (a magazine for my synagogue), so I told myself I couldn't get going on that until DD got squared away.

Before I move onto some other topics, a little background on this essay. Originally, this was to be a book. Despite its many strengths, Richard Sharp's book The Game of Diplomacy had more than a few deficiencies (most notably an wretched chapter on Turkey), and more to the point is long since out of print. Rod Walker's admirable effort I have discussed in DD #14/15, but mine was to be focussed just on the game. It was to include this Chapter on Tactics, one written by Randolph Smyth on Strategy and Negotiations, seven country chapters by seven authors (mine on Turkey had already been published in DW) and an essay by me on the differing formats for the game (postal, face to face, tournament, "school games", telephone and E-Mail). Alas, it was not to be. I suspect that all the feud activities on the mid-80s drained away too much energy. Doug Beyerlein did write an essay on Austria, which I think was published in DW. The format essay was never finished, and then there's this. In a sense, this was the most important part to me. Not because of the primary importance of Tactics -- it's negotiation that rules in Diplomacy --- but because Tactics was my personal strength. As a diplomat, I am only so-so at face-to-face or tournament, and reasonably good (but only that) postally. But in the tactical arena I felt I have a true mastery of the game. This not only reduced the tactical errors I would make in postal games, but often allowed

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me to become, in effect, the tactician for the alliances I formed in postal games. I would estimate that in at least half of my postal games, this ability to (unduly) influence the tactics of "our" alliance allowed me to gain the upper hand in these alliances. I have written many essays on strategy and on diplomacy, nearly all of them in DD or DW, but I don't believe that my grasp of these subjects was in any way unique --- I was just more willing than most to put the stuff down on paper. Plus, relatively few people wrote on tactics after the mid 70s --- lets face it, tactics seldom makes for interesting reading, especially if you are trying to do it in some depth. And finally, I feel that tactics is undervalued by simply saying that Diplomacy is a game of diplomacy. If all the players were indeed masters of the game's tactics, the game would be a straight strategic/diplomatic struggle, which in the long run would produce a higher-level game. But the real games don't operate that way; real games can and do turn on tactic competence.

OK, on to other topics. From here on out, my involvement in the postal Diplomacy hobby will be fairly minimal. I'm done with playing postally (and in retrospect, I shouldn't have signed up for the recent DW Demo game because I didn't have the drive to do it right). I do hope to write occasionally for DW. This I have not done over the past few years because I have felt guilty about contributing to DW when I had unfinished business here at DD. And I will continue to sell off back issues of DD (while supplies last) if people want to buy them. Should you want a listing of these, just drop me a line.

I don't have any terrible regret about this, because, as they say, "I had my fun". I have three Rod Walker Award plaques on my office wall, which is awarded by hobby vote for the best writing each year. This hobby has given me the two most interesting correspondences I've ever had, with Rod Walker and Francois Cuerrier, who along with Larry Peery are among the most fertile minds I've ever come across in the hobby. The many hours of enjoyment from reading Voice of Doom (the greatest dipzine of all time) would have alone justified my participation in the postal hobby. Altho my last game was lousy, I had some immensely satisfying postal results, including a 17-17 AT draw (in my opinion, the most difficult 2-way draw) a pair of Italian wins, winning a DW demo game, and beating Don Ditter to win the first North American Intimate Diplomacy tournament. And, curious as this may strike you, my protracted and ultimately successful attempt to wrest 1976EN from GM Cliff Mann, who would neither run it nor give it up was also very satisfying.

Which is not to say it's all been peaches and cream. I also had to deal with a few truly dishonest people, most particularly, Kathy Caruso, Steve Langley, Robert Sacks and Terry Tallman. Each of them on repeated occasions ascribed to me actions which had simply never taken place --- and without apologizing for doing so. It is a weird feeling to open a dipzine and have someone describe, say, a telephone conversation in which Bruce Linsey supposedly confessed to me some wrongdoing. It used to baffle me why people would discuss a fone conversation that they weren't a party to, and hadn't heard about from those actually on the line. Or would castigate a letter they had never seen. Or would describe the thought processes of a person who had obviously not confided in them. It was a while before I realized that for a few people, it really didn't make that much of a difference whether what

they said was true or not. But dealing with this I found immensely frustrating.

Fortunately, most of my interactions were overwhelmingly positive, even when they dealt with conflicts. I was often drawn to various types of conflict resolution, which would include such activities as mediating (successfully) the Linsey-Kendter dispute, advising at least three BNCs (on whether certain games should be labeled as irregular) acting as the ombudsman for Bob Sergeant's Postal Diplomacy Tournament, and at least a dozen times in ordinary postal games, and some related activities. Indeed, one of the more interesting ideas to arise from my correspondence with François Cuerrier was for a zine-of-record for ombudsmen. When a ruling was made (and could be made public), it would go in this zine, so others could see it as well. As it is, most of this stuff is never published, and when it is, it's so widely scattered as to be virtually irretrievable. Only a few issues of this Diplomacy Chronicle were published.

But it's the bigger projects that stick more clearly in mind, most especially the 1982 DipCon tournament. Part of the fabulous success of this was due to the good fortune of being connected to a big tournament. But part of it came, I believe, from a policy of regularly communicating to the hobby what was going on via a special zine. This brought useful input, and a lot of attention to DipCon. The Hobby Open Forum, the Tournament booklet mailed to all who played, and some other innovations made for a really successful operation.

But most rewarding of all for me was really my own writing. One item I was actually paid for --- Larry Peery awarded me \$100 for my essay "A Real Zoo", the only time in my life I was paid for a specific piece of writing. It was one of my most original pieces, since no one had ever tried to systematically categorize triple alliances. A similar approach was used in my favorite essay on openings, which organized French openings (a seemingly bewildering array) on the basis of how many pieces are ordered to border Belgium. Probably the most useful of my writings was the Lexicon of Diplomacy --- it has certainly been the most ordered back issue of DD.

The most adventurous writing was the fiction. Dipzines are filled with fiction, but very little of it centers squarely on the game itself. The longest was a very early piece on warfare between cross-game alliance clubs, and was reprinted in a "recent" DD. But the most fun were the Shep Rose pieces. These ran in DW, except for one episode that Kathy Caruso blocked so it ran in the fake DW. At one level he was an outrageous scoundrel, ^{who} really would do whatever it took, short of deceiving the GM, to get the upper hand. But on a more serious level, I wanted to explore a very murky area, viz., how legitimate is it for a player to involve the GM in his drive to win. The clash between a player's desire to win, and the GM's desire to be neutral presents a difficult ethical conflict, and I wanted to use these tales to explore it. My other main format for exploring odd ideas was the "Ask the Hobby Historian" series in DW, writing from the future about (fictitious) events. The one suggestion from that series that I regret no GM ever picked up on was a house rule to virtually eliminate draws, which says that when a game ends, the player with the most centers wins (in case of ties, you just go back seasons to resolve the tie).

The other idea that I was disappointed wasn't picked up on more was WAP,

War by Automatic Pilot. When a player NMRed, her orders from the previous move season were simply reused. This provides only limited protection, and doesn't work in S01 or in Winters, but these are orders written by the player of record, many will be sensible, and it's something a player herself could do, simply by including a photocopy of her orders with each move, labeling the copy as those for the next season. Of course, I'm not mentioning a few of my lousy ideas that never got picked up on either!



BERCH ARCHIVES NOW AVAILABLE TO NEW OWNER

My archives are, I suspect, the largest organized archives in the hobby, with the possible exception of the Hoosier Archives. It's in two parts, and I am seeking a new home for both. The main part is the organized archives. This consists of 18 boxes, each running around 33 pounds. Most of this is a series of North American Zines all done alphabetically, with the zines in numerical order within each title. There is a second alphabetical run of non-North American zines; these were separated because those zines often needed to be filed in legal sized drawers. There is also a box or so of unsorted zines, mostly from the early 90s that I was too lazy to file. If the boxes were lined up, they'd take about 36 running feet, but the zines are packed in. In file cabinets, you couldn't have them so packed so I'd figure you'll need more than 40 running feet of file drawers, i.e. more than 20 file cabinet drawers. Plus of course your collection to the extent that it doesn't overlap mine. I'll also toss in my index to articles which groups items into broad categories. It covers only a tiny amount of what is in the zines, tho. Don't ask for this material if you don't have the space for it!

The other items are the "spares". Basically, this is 8-12 boxes of either unsorted or semi-sorted zines, none of them later than 1976. I assembled the organized archives by going through the huge amount of material sent to me by Walt Buchanan (and a few other people) and assembling runs for individual titles. But I never finished the task. Some of this material thus simply duplicates material already present in the the organized archives; others is material absent. Since the organized archives is not cataloged, its fairly laborious figuring out which is which!

I am making both of these items available, and they don't necessarily have to go to the same person. If you want them, here's what you'll need to do. First, you'll need to either pick them up here in a reasonable period of time, or pay, in advance for my shipping them to you. Tell me which of the two items, or both, that you want. I'll send it USP"S" (call your local Post Office for the Parcel Post rate). I won't charge you for the boxes themselves (Buchanan charged me 50¢ a box!). If this material feeds a publication (which it almost certainly will or else you're not going to get it) you must promise me either a copy or an indefinite sub. And finally you need to write me telling me what you've done in the hobby (you don't have to be somebody I already know), and most importantly, what you plan to do with this material. I'm not going to ship it to you just so you can own it instead of me owning it. If I get several such offers, I'll take the "best" offer, in terms of making the material useful to the hobby, and having a reasonably good chance of success. If I get no appealing offer, I'll try again in a couple of years. Deadline for responding is ~~MAY~~ 15, 1994.

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THE TACTICS OF DIPLOMACY

Tactics are certainly not the reason people play Diplomacy --- there are a zillion other wargames providing wider tactical scope. After all, the game has only 2 types of pieces and only 4 things they can do. Calhamer wanted success to depend primarily on diplomatic prowess, so he kept the tactics simple.

But don't be disdainful, for they are an integral part of the game. Tactics are the actual expression of your intentions; they are the end result of your diplomacy. Tactics are the "bottom line". And just as your diplomacy influences tactics, the reverse also occurs. Good tactics permit your attacks to go more decisively, keeping you ahead of the pack. A stubborn defense can buy additional time for your diplomacy to work, and your attacker may decide that someone else's centers will be easier to seize. And in the twilight zone of wary mistrust, prudent tactical precautions may dissuade your ally from attacking you in the first place.

By contrast, poor tactics can be ruinous. If you bungle your attacks, your ally will inevitably pull ahead of you, and you may never catch up. Or perhaps he'll decide that a bumbler is useless as an ally, and turn on you. If you constantly rely on your ally to catch your mistakes in tactical planning, well, he may just not catch all of them. If you let him decide how to coordinate the attacks, guess who's going to grow faster.

In an ideally played game, every turning point would reflect a diplomatic triumph or failure. But in real game, tactical errors, or even the smallest of tactical shortcomings influence the outcome again and again. Each tactical choice sets the stage for the following season's diplomacy. And that diplomacy must be heavily influenced by your tactical choices --- the ones you know about.

In what follows, I have divided the maneuvers into 4 broad categories, but this is mostly a matter of convenient organization. Most tactics do not fall strictly into one category or another. For example, the indirect support is defensive, in the sense that you are trying to keep a piece from being dislodged, but I've placed it in the offensive group because it is normally used by countries on the attack. Stalemate lines have vital implications for attackers. Self standoffs can be used in purely offensive or defensive stances, etc.

THE TACTICS OF ATTACK

What could be simpler than attacking in Diplomacy? All you have to do is decide whether to grab for everything at once, or clobber units one at a time with everything you own. Many players actually take this view; the technical term for them is "losers".

What follows are many of the aspects of the attack. Some are so common they occur nearly every season. Others are so rare that you may never see them at all. But you should be familiar with them all, because opportunities at Diplomacy sometimes present themselves but once.

1. Providing Assistance. The great majority of successful attacks on Supply Centers require more than one piece, and frequently more than two. If you only have 2 pieces, one supports the other, but where should the attack come from? Look at the next season: What will you need? What will be in the way? If your Italian armies are in

Boh and SO4, SO4: A Boh S A Tyo-Mun is fine if you plan to press the attack further next season with A Ven-Tyo, or perhaps with A Mun S A Boh-Sil; you don't want, for example, Tyo occupied and block the movement of A Ven, and you want Boh in place to move to Sil. On the other hand, if your next target is Pie or Tri, you'll want to do A Tyo S A Boh-Mun, so that A Tyo will remain in place, available for support in FO4. You also want to consider which piece's support is more likely to be cut. If your sole concern is maximizing your chances of success in the attack, then move with the piece most likely to be itself attacked.

With more than two pieces, you must also decide whether the third piece should be used to support, or to cut the defenders support. This usually depends on how you think the defenders will do their job. If your piece is likely to be cut from the outside, then you must either attack with it, or use it to cut support. For example, facing A War-Ukr-Rum, you have A Pru-Sil-Gal. You want Winter in Warsaw, but without a Galacian Guess. Simple support could be cut with A Rum-Gal; an attack from Galacia could be reversed (see next section). So just cut the only defense with A Gal-Ukr, and take War from Sil or Pru. But even cutting a supposed defender can be utterly wasteful if that defender is used to cut a defense. Thus, if you had A Mos in place of A Sil, then A Gal-Ukr, A Mos S A Pru-War will be foiled by A Ukr-Mos alone.

2. Timing The Attack. The general question of when to initiate the attack is dictated by strategic and diplomatic considerations. The specific sequencing often depends on how fast and how sure you want the attack. It often boils down to this: For greater assurance, go for position; for greater speed, go for centers.

Suppose W03 finds you with A Bel, A Swe, A Lon, F Nth, F Nwy. The enemy has A Hol, A Kis, A Den. You can support a convoy to Hol or Den --- but not both. A Kis can support Den or Hol --- but not both. It's a 50-50 guess which he'll defend. If you guess right in SO4 and annihilate A Den, you're guaranteed Hol as well in FO4. Even if you guess right and dislodge A Hol in SO4, you still have a decent shot at Den in FO4. And a wrong guess in SO4 but a right one in FO4 gives you one center. But alas, there is a 25% chance of two wrong guesses --- and nothing! Is that an acceptable risk? Often it is --- especially with those chances at 2 builds. But sometimes it isn't. You may not need two builds, but one may be absolutely essential --- perhaps F Lpl must be built for an upcoming war with France. Or maybe the enemy is bringing in a spare unit and you must force a removal on him early. In that case, play for position: F Nth-Hel, F Nwy-Nth. You have no chances for two, but one is guaranteed, and you can take your choice, as Kis can be cut from Hel in FO4. These kinds of choices, center vs position, are fairly common. In the Lepanto, Italy must choose in FO2 between position (F Ion & F Eas C A Tun-Syr) or center (... C A Tun-Smy). Germany, having taken Jur in SO1, ponders whether to grab Par/Har, or smooch himself in Gascony. Russia, in Nth facing English A Yor, wonders whether to guess for the SC, or convoy to Yor for future gains. There are no reliable rules for deciding which way to go. My purpose here is to make sure that you see that there is a tactical choice to be made. Which path to take depends primarily on how fast you think you need to grow. The "positional" move also gives you one last chance to change your mind. But your ally may view it as stalling.

3. The Convoy. The judicious use of the convoy is one of the ways the expert player can be distinguished from the average one. The convoyed attack is a powerful tool with some very heavy benefits, in addition to being a lot of fun:

a. Rapid exposure of inland centers. To the Russian, A Den, F Bal might not seem to be a threat to War and Mos. But after F Bal C A Den-Lvn, things will look very different! This is a case of pure synergism between army and fleet: Neither alone could possibly threaten those centers, but together they can. Similarly, F Mid C A Naf-Gas suddenly endangers Par, Mar and Bur; and there are others which have caught defenders napping. Moves like these give the convoyed army such range that the enemy may have to drop everything else to guard against them.

b. Speed. The convoy moves pieces great distances. To move an army overland from Swe to Pru would take 4 seasons; by convoy, only one. Multifleet convoys extend the range. England can build A Ion, and with just F Eng and F Mid, the army is in Naf, to attack Tun that fall. Multifleet convoys tend to be more important in the latter half of the game, when navies are larger, and the front line is far away from where armies are built. Players cannot afford the time it takes to move the armies one province at a time.

c. Substitution of army for a fleet. Suppose it is W01, and you have F Nap, F Ion, A Tun, and A Ven -- a common situation. You plan a supported attack on Gre or Tri in the fall. F Ion-Alb, F Nap-Ion will do the job, but suppose you'd like to send a fleet west as well? F Ion C A Tun-Alb takes care of your Balkan duties, while F Nap-Tyh prepares to move west.

d. Flexibility and surprise. The convoy is yet another option for the fleet, giving you more choices than just attack and support. This provides you with a better chance of surprising the defender with an unexpected choice. Moreover, because of the larger territory covered by sea spaces, convoyed attacks can be developed very quickly. Italy may be poised to attack France with A Pie, F Iyo, F Tyh. But a sudden shift of A Pie-Tus, F Iyo-Tyh, F Tyh-Ion means the army is Balkan Bound. With a similar quick shift, France can move from an attack on Italy to one on England. England can redeploy an army in Scandinavia against Germany or France. An inexperienced player may not even have considered a convoy choice, such as F Bal C A Den-Lvn or F Iyo C A Spa-Tus, to name two which have caught defenders with their pants down in more than one game.

e. Security. The convoy allows a player to attack from a space without having to give up control of it. Thus, F Tyn C A Rom-Tun will shut out F Iyo-Tyh, allowing you to retain control. It will thwart the "moving defense" (see next section). If the attack on the convoying fleet is coming from the space you are convoying to, the "convoy advantage" will allow your attack to proceed at "even" --- or unfavorable --- odds. For example, S13 in 1979AC had the following:

Turkey: F Aeg & F Ion C A Smy-Nap, F Apu S A Smy-Nap, A Smy-Nap, F Eas S F Ion.
France: F Tun S F Nap-Ion, F Nap-Ion(annihilated)

Note that the attack on F Ion is nullified by the support given to F Ion by F Eas. Thus, the attack on Naples succeeds with just one support, despite the fact that the attack in the "opposite direction" (somewhat) was also with one support. And finally, the convoying fleet can provide support for the just landed army in the following season if you fear an immediate attempt to dislodge.

But it's all too easy to get carried away with this, merrily criss-crossing the board with your nifty convoys while some unimaginative character bulldozes forward and wins the game. So let's have a doleful look at some of the drawbacks:

i. It ties up extra units. Even an unsupported convoy takes two pieces. A long, unsuccessful convoy is a terrible waste of resources. In general, the longer the convoy, the more confident you should be of success before you try it. But even a successful convoy can delay the development of your fleets. In 1972CR, Beyerlein convoyed A Con-Spa. The onlookers in this demo game were impressed, but at least 2 of the fleets never made it to the front.

ii. Inactive Pieces. The army may have to wait till the fleet is in position, or vice versa. For multifleet convoys, some may have to wait, with little to do, while the last one gets in place.

iii. Security can be risked. A fleet that convoys to save an army time might have supported another unit which needed some help.

iv. A convoyed attack does not cut support if a convoying fleet is dislodged. In an ordinary attack, the support is cut regardless of what else happens

Thus, the convoy is an extremely powerful tool, giving you important options and complicating the defender's tasks. But it also has serious drawbacks which must be taken into account in some situations

4. Annihilation. These sometimes occur without any special effort on your part. The board may be crowded, or it may occur in a region of the board (e.g. Por, or A Den). More commonly, it will take so care on your part --- which can be richly rewarded. If done in spring, he'll play short for at least one season. If his home centers are jammed, or needed for other builds, this can cost him the services on that unit for quite a few seasons, a nice payoff for a one-time investment or an extra piece or two on your part. Even if he can rebuild, the new unit may be far from the front lines, or he may have to endanger a home center to keep it open, or tie up pieces in a self standoff to do it. Moreover, if he's losing a center at the same time, you've deprived him of the right to choose which piece to remove. He may have been counting on removing a useless piece elsewhere. When arranging for this tactic, keep in mind that a self-standoff (covered later) will blanket 3 retreat spaces with just 2 units.

5. Indirect Support. Sometimes you'll want to attack from a space which you fear will itself be a target of a supported attack. The solution is your own supported attack on that space. Perhaps you want to cut the support given by F Ber with A Mun-Ber, but fear A Ruh S A Kie-Mun. Support indirectly with A Tyo S A Boh-Mun. Of course, if there's A Ber, you'll need to add e.g. A Bur S A Boh-Mun to cope with the possibility of a doubly supported attack on Mun. This type of "support" is not that uncommon, as it frees the player to risk attacks with forward pieces he might otherwise shy away from endangering. Such pieces usually cannot be used for support (as they will likely be cut), so you need to attack with them.

6. Offensive retreat. Never overlook the possibility of retreating a dislodged piece forward. Usually, only inept players will hand you such a delightful option. The rest you may be able to create for yourself by having an ally dislodge you. Suppose your F Tyh faces A Apu. Why guess Rom-or-Nap? Have your ally do F Tun S F Wes-Tyh, and just retreat to whichever is open.

7. Raider. This is an isolated unit which is behind enemy lines, where it can drive the enemy bonkers. At a minimum, he'll let you have a SC, and dispatch a single unit to snatch it back when you move off to take a second SC. If he elects to track you down, it will normally take 3-5 pieces to annihilate you, tho he may be able to corner you with just 2. Both choices give you great advantages. As long as you are alive, you threaten his centers, you can cut crucial supports, or provide supports, and prevent the formation of a stalemate line. Tracking you down will probably pull units far out of position, if he can spare them at all. Raiders are most commonly created by offensive retreats, a player who suddenly switches sides, or who simply reaches a poorly defended border quicker than expected. Diplomacy World Demo games 1980AY and 1976BG both featured Italian fleet raiders, which slipped behind the West's lines and had an overwhelming impact on the game.

8. Clean Lines. On the border between tactical and strategic considerations is the question of how one's units should be placed. In general, the most efficient method is the "expanding hollow shell". A line is formed with no gaps in it, and this gradually expands as the radius of the shell gets larger and larger. Countries with substantial access to the board's edge will find this easiest to do. During the first half of the game to complete the shell you will normally need an ally. A good example is A/I, which can fairly early on construct a shell running Wes to Tyo to Gal to Bul to Aeg, and then continue to expand. T/R creates a wave-front which slowly engulfs Austria, Germany, Italy and Scandinavia. Without holes in the line, pieces do not have to shift to guard against possible sneaky attempts to slip thru the lines. Freshly built units can reach the front lines in a minimum amount of time. By contrast, if you create a long salient or probe (e.g. France swallows Germany, then sends his armies to War, Mos and StP), then your lines present a larger "surface", which takes

more units to cover. The cutting edge is much further from the home centers where units are built.

Inevitably, some "bunching" of units will occur in areas where you meet more determined resistance. This especially can occur in the Balkans, which is so rich in SCs. Once the war is over, you'll want to smooth things out as quickly as possible, altho you must weight that need against the desire to maintain momentum.

The worst situation in this regard is when your units are isolated in places where they can easily be picked off. This can especially be a problem with your most forward units, as they are most likely to be facing more enemy units, and they represent your most expensive investment in time, since they've moved the furthest from home.

A truly spectacular example of this occurred in 1979EO. Turkey had grown steadily, and by 1908, his armies stood in Sil, Tyo, Boh, and Tri and further back. Opposing him was France with 12 (Armies in Mun and Ruh and Bur, builds in Par and Mar, plus F Den) and 3 Italian fleets. German A Kie was in CD. In S09, Turkey moved aggressively with A Boh S A Tyo-Mun, A Tri-Tyo, A Sil-Ber. France made no attempt to defend Mun, using Ruh instead to take Kie, and moved A Bur-Ruh, A Par-Bur, A Mar-Pie. A Mun retreated to Sil. In F09 came the crunch. A Sil cut Boh, A Pie cut A Tyo. A Kie, A Ruh S A Bur-Mun annihilated the forward Tur A Mun. Turkey's hopes for winning centers in the north were ruined because he had pushed his units forward too quickly, without filling in the vital Sil. S10 completed the rout, as A Kie S A Sil-Ber shut T out completely. With his fear of a Turkish win completely removed, F felt confident enuf to stab Italy also in S10, and won in 1911.

9. The Loop. Sad to say, some of the most amusing tactics are the rarest. This is one of them. You'd like to do F Aeg S A Bul-Con, but alas, the enemy looks set to reverse it with A Rum S A Con-Bul. Solution? Convoy around the attack. F Aeg C A Bul-Con. Besure to bring up fresh units to get rid of his new A Bul, of course.

THE TACTICS OF DEFENSE

It is all too easy to dismiss defensive tactics as dismal and unnecessary. After all, you're going to win, right? And winners are on the attack! The people who hold such views, and ignore the tactics of defense, often find their attacks stalled.

To begin with, the majority of games even for good players are not wins after all. Moreover, even most won games are not an uninterrupted series of successful attacks. And even if you are never seriously attacked, you must be aware of the types of defenses your victims are likely to erect. The best attack, after all, is one which thwarts the defense, and if you aren't aware of the tricks available to the defenders, you may find yourself frustrated.

For a defender, a stubborn defense can break the rhythm of the attack, and may damage the foe's self-confidence. It may even unhinge his alliances. He may need to bring up a "spare" unit to force the attack on you, or he may be deprived of an early build he was counting on. These may make a stab by his ally suddenly feasible. Or, frustrated by failure against you, he may decide to snatch something from his ally to keep the Supply Center balance from being too drastically upset. Or a good defense may buy you enough time for your successes elsewhere to generate fresh units, or time for you to bring a unit in from another front, or time for your ally to lend you a hand. Sometimes, only a single season's stall is all you need.

And sometimes not. You may need to defend for 3 or 4 seasons running. Your choices are limited. Altho one type of defense may be the most efficient, it is often

unwise to use it season after season. Becoming predictable may be all the attacker needs for success.

Finally, mention should be made of the "guess". Defenseive tactics, more than any other, sometimes amount to a guess. Which center will he go for? Which unit will actually make the attack? You may be able to shade your guess by putting yourself in the attacker's shoes. But don't make the mistake of asking, "Now, how would I attack here?" Phrase it, "Now, how would he attack here?" Go back and look at his other attacks for a clue. Does he go for broke, or is he more methodical? Does he tend to use all of his forces on just one target, or does he attack at several places at once? If the attack fails the first time, does he try it again, or does he immediately switch his approach? These questions may give you that vital clue for selecting the best defense.

1. The Moving Defense. Oddly, a Supply Center can sometimes be best defended by moving away from it. Suppose your A Sev is faced by the enemy's A StP, A Mos. Your task is to defend Sev for 2 seasons. If you do A Sev h, he'll do A Mos-Ukr, A StP-Mos, and take Sev next season. One tactic is to move A Sev-Ukr. If this works everything is stalled, but there is the risk of A Mos-Sev, which not only immediately loses the center, but makes you look like a complete idiot. Best is A Sev-Mos. That blocks A StP-Mos for a season, and there's no risk to Sev. Overusing the hold order is a common error among starting players, and even some intermediate players.

2. Reversing the attack. This is a procedure whereby you try to keep a piece in place by attacking with equal force in the opposite direction to the anticipated attack. Thus, F Naf S F Ion-Tun can be reversed with F Alb S F Tun-Ion. This is an important option when your pieces are not adjacent. There are drawbacks and risks. If your support may be cut (e.g. A Ser-Alb), then your pieces may be wasted --- something that would not happen if you use it to cut support, i.e. F Alb-Ion. If you've guessed wrong, he will have the retreat choice, and you won't. Thus, if he did F Ion S F Naf-Tun, then you must go to Ion, and his F Ion has its choice of retreat spaces. By contrast, if you had tried to cut support (F Alb-Ion) and guessed wrong, you'd be in Ion, and your retreating fleet could pick the best space. Thus, your decision hinges on 3 questions: Where will the attack come from? How useful to me will it be to select my retreat space? How dangerous is it to let him retreat? If there are no retreat spaces, this can influence your decision profoundly.

3. Providing assistance. You often must choose between supporting the piece directly with a support order, and cutting the support of an enemy piece you think will be supporting. The same considerations as were discussed above in the attack section apply to the defender, and need not be repeated here. In many circumstance, you will have no more than a blind guess. In these situations, and with reversing an attack, a couple of principles will be of value.

A. The more places a piece can be used against you, the better off you are just cutting it. Suppose the enemy has units in Ntn, Bel, and Swe. You have A Hol, A Den, F Hel. Rather than trying to guess which attack F Ntn will support, and defending that piece with your F Hel, just cut it with F Hel-Nth, and take care of either possibility of support.

B. Look closely at the I-Guessed-Wrong scenario, and make your evaluation on that. It may seem like a glum way to play the game, but you must consider it. This was mentioned above in Reversing the attack, but it applies here too. If you try to cut a unit which turns out to be the attacker, will you get into that space? Do you want to be there rather than where you presently are? Even if it doesn't much matter where that piece is, your dislodged piece may be in need of a retreat square --- and your zipping into the space where the attacker came from may open up a vital place for you to retreat to. You will be frequently be cutting an attacker's support (rather than simply providing support directly) because you are afraid that direct support will be cut by another piece. But if the piece you attack turns out to be the attacker, you zip into his space, and the piece trying to cut your (non-existent) support will move

into the space you just vacated. Do you want that last move to happen? If not, you may need to provide a followup attack on your own space to keep him out (this is analogous to indirect support). The point here is that if you try to cut the "support" of an enemy piece which turns out to be the successful attacker, you may set into motion a chain of other, unintended moves. You should check out every element of that chain, to make sure that this is a risk you are prepared to take.

4. Off board retreat. There's no law requiring you to retreat a dislodged unit; you can remove it instead and possibly build for it later. Suppose you are Italy, with r Nao, and suddenly you are attacked in your homeland by Turkey. Moving NAO-Mid-Wes-Tyh will take 3 seasons. Instead, if you think the fleet will be dislodged (or you can arrange this), leave it there --- don't move it to Mid. It can then be retreated OTB, and rebuilt in Nap. This won't work if you have a removal coming, or can't take the extra build, but it's a fine way to bolster the home defenses, especially if you are spread out and stabbed in midgame.

5. The Scissors. This is an easily overlooked tactic. It is best employed in crowded situations where: 1) you are afraid that any support will be cut, and 2) you can't tell where an enemy piece will provide its support, and 3) you don't want your pieces to move. The tactic is basically a self-standoff in the space occupied by the enemy piece. Suppose your A Tri, A Vie face the enemy in Ven, Tyo, Gal. If your pieces just mutually support each other, he can take any center either way he decides to attack. Even if you could arrange for Ven or Gal to be attacked from the outside, that wouldn't necessarily be enough --- he'd use that piece to cut your support, and attack with the other two. But the scissors, A Tri-Tyo, A Vie-Tyo, means that Tyo cannot be used for support in either attack. The tactic is not foolproof of course --- in 2 against 3 situations your are outnumbered. If the attack is coming from Tyo, the attack will succeed regardless of which defense you use. But even here, the scissors has potential value, as you are sure to enter Tyo, threatening perhaps Lun. The scissors also saves you the mental agony of trying to guess where Tyo will provide its support. It will foil the Loop. For a recent example, England used the scissors in rO of the DW Demo game, 83X: F Nth-Den, F Swe-Den retained Swe for the build, and prevented F Den from supporting Ger F Ska to either Swe or Nth.

6. Use of Terrain. Whenever possible, use the terrain of the board to help bolster your defense. These situations normally occur around Switzerland and the board edges. A Pie, for example, blocks western army movement; A Bar blocks eastern, unless Tvo can be taken. F Arm S F Sla is a fine shield for Turkey, taking advantage of the fact that Armenia cannot be flanked. Be alert to circumstances created by imbalances in the enemy's units. If Russia has no northern fleets, Nwy S StP is a cheap defense for all of Scandinavia; Den is very hard to take without fleets.

7. Pinning. A Fleet can occasionally be pinned in a position where it will do little harm. For example, Turkey, with F Ank, F Sla may be willing to accept A Sev, F Arm. After all, F Arm cannot threaten Smy, but Rus A Arm could. Similarly, a Fleet could be trapped in Gas, where it can prevent an army from getting into Gar and thereby, Par, Bar and Bur are safeguarded. Armies are much more difficult to pin, since they can, with some risk, be convoyed out.

8. Blocking. Nothing can infuriate an enemy more than having his pieces blocked. Suppose, for example, France's F Mid C A Bre-NAF catches the Italian fleets napping in Ion, Eas, and Aeg. If Italy guards Tun next season with F Ion-Lun, France parries with A NAF-Lun, and progresses with F Mid-Wes, preparing to take Tun with support. But Ion's failure to move blocks F Eas and F Aeg from moving west, since Aeg-Gre-Alb-Adr-Apu-Nap-Tyn will take forever. If Italy bypasses Tun with F Ion-Tyn, r Eas-Ion, France's A NAF-Tun, F Mid-Wes will take and hold the center.

9. Disrupting a convoy. A convoyed attack, regardless of how much support it has, will not go if the convoy is disrupted. Keep this in mind, especially if the convoyed attack would be on your fleet, since the convoyed attack will not cut that support. Sometimes, the best defense is an attack!

THE TACTICS OF MISTRUST

Suspicion is, as Rod Walker put it, a "professional courtesy" extended to the other players. There are times when suspicion of an ally must take a tangible form --- an action on the board. These actions both reduce the damage of a stab, and partially dissuade the stabber. After all, if he knows you'll be at least partially prepared for a betrayal, the stab is less lucrative, and hence less appealing. This section will look at these tactics, beginning with the simpler ones (going into some detail) and concluding with some rather sophisticated tricks rarely seen.

1. Self-Standoff For example, FO1: A Spa-Mar, A Bur-Mar. This not only retains Spa (for the build) and A Bur (to foil e.g. A Rub-Bur) but guards Mar against Ital A Pie-Mar and keeps Mar open for a build. Most of the time, however, you either just want to protect all three spaces, or the standoff space is too sensitive to enter.

The self-standoff can be voided, however, by unwanted support: A Pie S French A Spa-Mar, the "Reinhardt Gambit". Then A Spa-Mar does go. There was some debate in the very early days of the hobby as to whether you could be supported against your will (the old Rulebook did not have II,4), a debate which has echoes in the more recent "unwanted, superflous convoy" discussion. The gambit can itself be foiled by cutting the support, e.g. Germany: A Tyo-Pie.

A second way the selfstandoff can be voided is by disrupting a convoy. Consider the following: France: F Por S F Mid, F Mid C A Naf-Bre, A Naf-Bre, A Par-Bre. England: F Eng & F Iri S Ital F Wes-Mid Italy: F Wes-Mid. Here, France hoped to guard Bre against F Eng-Bre and keep it open for a build in the following winter. But he was afraid England would do F Iri S F Eng-Mid, so he convoys the standoff. Thus, he supports F Mid and has the mechanics of a standoff. But he didn't figure on Ital F Wes, so he not only loses Mid (which couldn't be helped), but also loses the self-standoff, since the convoying fleet was dislodged.

There is a third way in which your selfstandoff can be foiled in which your fleet is not dislodged and none of your pieces are supported. Lets suppose that you want to guard Rom and Nap against Turkish F Tyh and keep Naples open for a build. And, for whatever reason, you decide to use a convoy, hence: A Rom-Nap, F Ion C A Tun-Nap. To guard against the Reinhardt Gamit, you do F Wes-Tyh. You think you are safe. You are wrong. The turks do F Tyh C Ital A Tun-Nap and the French do F Lyo S Ital F Wes-Tyh, dislodging F Tyh. Under III,4 A Tun does not move!! So A Rom-Nap succeeds and Tur F Tyh retreats to Rom! This is an unbelievably exotic trick, and won't work under the 1983 Rulebook in the U.S. --- but what fun it would be to pull it off!

If both attacks of a self-standoff could be convoys, the chances of your getting suckered by the Reinhardt Gambit go down --- he has to guess whether the attack will be with armies or fleets.

There are some drawbacks to all this, tho. You have one fewer retreat square if your unit is dislodged. And it uses two pieces to guard what may only be one critical spot. And you are moving to it only with the strength of one, not two.

2. Arranged Standoff. For example, SO1: F Sev-Bla, F Ank-Bla. Everything said about the self-standoff applies here, too, but there are extra considerations.

The first is the correct selection of the standoff space. Often more than one are available. Ger A Pic, Fre A Gas could standoff in Bre, Par, or Bur. Ideally, the space will be more important to him than to you (in case of his NMR). It sometimes works out that the standoff space is selected just by who suggests the idea first.

Second, the standoff space itself may be of no importance, but you want a certain spot occupied. Turkey may insist on F Sev-Bla, F Con-Bla in a fall season solely to keep R from building F Sev. These two considerations may be enuf that you will want to delay the standoff for a season to get units positioned properly.

Third, there may be no sensitive spaces at all --- you just want to tie up his piece. If your ally is bringing fresh pieces to the front so quickly that he threatens to pull too far ahead, and you have a spare piece, suggest a self-standoff just to slow him down. This is often a problem with those allied with Russia. Turkey may, however, have a spare army, not used in his own fleet push, and will propose a standoff.

Fourth, you must check for doublecrosses. Don't assume he wouldn't dare let you in. Keeping in mind that he may bring up another piece or two, work out any doublecross scenario at least two seasons ahead. This is especially true if the pieces in the proposed standoff are adjacent to each other, so that he might move into the spot you'd be vacating.

Fifth, NMRs are a particular problem. They are always bad, but are worse here. Not only will you be pressed by your enemy, but you know you'll be "attacked" by your ally as well. Further, this "attack" by your ally cannot be dislodged the following season, because you'll have to assume that he'll voluntarily withdraw from the space he entered by accident. But your ally now has your carelessness as an excuse to attack you. Plus, he figures he can try to move that piece forward, and possibly bring another piece into the standoff space, since you won't be attacking it. An inexpensive form of protection in a postal game is to make an extra carbon of your, say, SO4 orders. Label the carbon FO4, and include it in the same envelope as your SO4 orders. If your real FO4 orders are forgotten or lost by the USP"S", your SO4 orders will, in effect, be repeated. Most of your orders may look silly, but your standoff order will remain valid, since that piece doesn't move and gets the same order season after season. Incidentally, this ploy can be faked. If, after SO4, it is agreed not to repeat the standoff, you might send in a repeat of the SO4 orders, labeled as FO4, and then blame the USP"S" for losing your real FO4, and thereby, you enter the space.

Sixth, keep in mind that other players may not be sure that the standoff was arranged, even tho they may strongly suspect it. You at least have the option of trying to misrepresent the attack as authentic --- but keep in mind that your ally can do the same. Similarly, if you've promised someone to attack by a certain season, but you don't want to, you can always arrange to have the attack stood off. You only promised to attack, not to succeed. If circumstances so require, you can announce a stand-off by fiat -- just inform your ally that you are moving to the space and invite him to stand you off. This may strain the relationship a bit, tho....

Finally, keep in mind that the endgame often finds both allies with numerous surplus units --- and at a time when even a small stab can be decisive. If you fear this, start tying up units with either multiple standoffs or supported standoffs.

3. Mutual Attack. You do FNwy-Swe while your ally does F Swe-Nwy. Obviously, a standoff in Ska is too risky. This tactic is sometimes overlooked because it seems to have no advantage over both units holding. As in the arranged standoff, these moves may create some doubt as to whether you are at war. Similarly, it ties up one of his units, which can slow him down. But most important, your F Nwy H could be double crossed by F Swe-Ska, A Den-Swe, permitting a supported attack on Nwy the following season. But F Nwy-Swe will stand off A Den-Swe, forcing him to spend an extra season to do F Ska S A Den-Swe. And if you've got F Nth to cut Ska, he may never succeed with A Den-Swe. As in the next two maneuvers, it is best to tell you ally that you are doing this. The prospect of taking Nwy in just 2 seasons may be just enuf to tip his thinking toward a full scale stab. Knowing that a spring stab won't net him Nwy by Fall may make the stab insufficiently appealing. As with the arranged stand-off this can be announced by fiat --- just announce that you're moving F Swe-Nwy.

4. Schizophrenic Support. Now we are getting fancy. Suppose your ally is to take the empty Bel via F Nth-Bel. But you fear F Nth C A Yor-Bel. Solution? You order A Pic-Bel and A Bur S Eng F Nth-Bel. This will also assure that someone will take Bel in case of an English NMR, or in case of English betrayal. If there is an enemy unit in Bel, you can still keep his army from being convoyed in with something like A Pic S Fre A Bel, A Bur & A Hol S Eng F Nth-Bel.

5. Schizophrenic Attack. This variation uses attacks only. Suppose your ally is to dislodge Par, but the agreement is A Pic S A Bur-Par, and not vice versa. You order A Gas-Par, A Mar-Bur. The former means he will need support; the latter means that only A Pic can provide it. If Par is occupied, A Gas-Par can be dispensed with.

6. Deliberate disorder or NMR. Whether the deliberate disorder/NMR is actually a tactical or a strategic manoeuvre is somewhat semantic, and its inclusion in the mistrust section is somewhat arbitrary. How often this tactic has actually been used is difficult to determine. It is not unusual to read of one in e.g. an endgame statement. But the player may just be trying to put a false face of a screwup. The most extreme claim for success with this tactic I have ever run across was made by Allan Marsden (Qde #38). He claimed that his growing from 1 to 5 centers in a Chimaera game occurred because he "frequently and deliberately NMRed" (British games do not replace NMRing players). The opportunity for this tactic can arise only in a few circumstances:

a. You are under some obligation to make a certain move, and don't plan to do it, and need some plausible explanation why it wasn't done. Or you may want to postpone the move for a season. This is by far the most common of these three circumstances. There are a number of ways to do this. The simplest is to disorder the piece, or alternatively to forget to order it. This minimizes the damage, but is most likely to arouse suspicion. At the other extreme, you could NMR, which is a very drastic solution to a problem which may only involve one piece. A method that I have used more than once in Tournament play is to double order the piece. Obviously, you are going to need more than one or two pieces to do this persuasively. In fact, with a long list of pieces, I have gone so far as to show my ally where the move has been hurriedly written down at the end of the list, with my thumb on top of the other move for that piece. You then turn it in immediately, and later commiserate that "we both overlooked that it was double ordered."

b. You want to give the impression that you are NMRing out of the game. If you are being crushed by a loose alliance in a no-standby game, for example, and the allies think you have dropped, they may feel it is safe to quarrel over the spoils rather than carefully grind you down. Or you may hope that they will decide not to attack your country because they believe a different player will be in charge and don't want to antagonize him. This could arise when you think you are being attacked for reasons of personal animosity and you hope they won't make orders conditional on who is playing the country.

c. You want to obscure the fact that your own piece is being dislodged in a Friendly Attack, and you don't want this foiled with an unwanted support -- or any other circumstance where you don't want to move and you don't want to be supported. In this case, you make an illegal move (e.g. A Mun-Par). Keep in mind, however that only some GMs accept the notion that a piece ordered to move illegally, cannot receive support in place. Others will consider "ordered to move" as not including illegal moves, and you risk having your friendly attack foiled by an unwanted support. Of course, you could play Diplomacy for 50 years and never have that particular problem!

In any of the above, some diplomacy will be needed to smooth over any hard feelings that might result from this exhibition of mistrust. Also, if he wasn't planning to attack you, your suspicions may cause him to think: "I wonder if his mistrust just reflects the fact that he's planning to stab me." If you've had good contact with your ally, you should have a general idea of how to deal with this touchy situation.

In summary, then, there are times when you distrust your neighbor, thinking he may attack you or expand too quickly, or move in the wrong way. There are methods of dealing with this, tho they will all cost you the use of one or more pieces. These will either reduce the damage of the stab, or dissuade him altogether. Indeed, the hardest thing to resist is temptation, and placing unnecessary temptations before any ally can be fatal.

STALEMATE LINES

Stalemate lines form the invisible topography of the Diplomacy map. The beginner sees thick lines and thin ones, dots and coasts. The experienced player sees other relationships. He knows the connection between Por and control of Mid; of the importance of the English and Turkish home centers; when Tunis is vital and when it is worthless. She may do strange things --- ignore a supply center or build a plethora of fleets or make great sacrifices to generate a raider. Above all, he sees the hidden terrain with a double vision. *His* lines are fortresses to reach or fall back to; *your* lines are obstacles to overcome.

A stalemate line is a linkage of units which cannot be dislodged. It requires that 1) pieces be in the right position and of the proper type 2) Support (and, rarely, move) orders be given every season, and 3) Except where indicated, the enemy have no units behind the lines, and no capacity to build them there.

Many players mistakenly view a stalemate line as something which doesn't involve foresight, something which just "happens", and if the game gets to that point, it's over. Nothing could be further from the truth. The stalemate line may be the most important strategic factor on the board itself. Long range planning for a win frequently requires figuring out which stalemate lines block your path to 18 centers. Moreover, if the "leader" is really a 2- or 3-way alliance, a stalemate line can shatter the alliance --- and the first person to realize this will be in the best position to exploit any falling out. Two players who had sincerely planned to split the board 17-17 must suddenly pick another goal, since the plan has been thwarted by a third player and her stalemate line. That other goal may be a victory --- which requires a stab. Even when players are entrenched at their lines, the grisly process of "shortening the draw" (eliminating minor powers) requires a precise knowledge of stalemate lines. Many a player who wasn't eliminated owes his survival to the fact that he selected key SCs to be his last ones --- right on a stalemate line. The construction and prevention of stalemate lines does not have the drama or stabbing allies or relentlessly grabbing SCs. but it can easily determine the game's outcome.

It is very unlikely that you will be studying in detail the lines which follow. But there are some general principles which you should be familiar with:

1. **England and Turkey.** With a few exotic exceptions, all stalemate lines require possession of all the English or Turkish home centers (or both). No stalemate line can be assembled without either all the Turkish home SCs or at least one English home SC. Thus, you must either own them, or become indispensable to someone who does. An alliance between England and Turkey (or those who own the ET home centers) is thus especially dangerous --- no one else is safe. This probably accounts for why these two countries do so well in terms of showing up in postal draws.

2. **Switzerland.** The great majority of lines actually formed in games use Switzerland, usually passing from one board edge through it to the opposite side. Most stalemate lines can thus be viewed as two somewhat independent half-lines, each going from a board edge and meeting in Switzerland. As a result, the provinces which border Switzerland tend to be more important than those which do not.

3. **Gibraltar.** This is the most important bottleneck on the board. It is easily barred from either direction (e.g. F Por and F Eng S F Mid will keep southern fleets hemmed in). Most alliances must either plan in advance to get through it, or cope elsewhere with their inability to do so. France is pivotal here because only she can build on either side of it.

4. **St. Petersburg.** The other major bottleneck, it's more of a problem for the south than the north. Norway (or Bar, etc.) S StP will always hold it for the west, unless Russia retains a fleet, and even that requires only one extra unit. Indeed, in the context of stalemate lines, StP is better considered a Scandinavian center, as its ownership is more closely linked to who owns Nwy than to who owns Mos. StP is the only example of a home SC that is often not held by the dominant power assembling a stalemate line. For the West, Mid and StP tend to be the crucial anchors in constructing many, many lines. No such comparable generality exists for the east.

5. **Fleets.** These tend to be more important in making and breaking lines than armies. This is particularly a problem for Austria or Germany (who may not have enough) and Russia (who may have them on the wrong side of the board).

6. **Functional Stalemate Line.** This is a line which, although not technically a stalemate line, cannot be broken. They might arise when the opposition is short a unit or two, for example, when the player who is entitled to build cannot do so. Or the opposition has the wrong mix of armies and fleets (generally, too few of the latter). Or an army may be available in the British Isles, with no way to convoy it to where it is needed. The circumstances generally arise out of poor planning.

7. **Pseudo-Stalemate Lines.** This is a line which, while not impregnable, might as well be. It may take so much time and effort to crack that the opposition won't bother, or don't want to take the risk that the alliance will fall apart in the process. A player may be unwilling to take the chance of unguarding his centers. On occasion, defenders have persuaded the dominant alliance that they have a line which they actually don't.

8. **Dynamic Stalemate Lines.** Sometimes, you don't need to quite reach the line to do the job. For example, the mini-line mentioned in 3. above can also be done with e.g. F Eng & F Por S F Iri-Mid. If you can do that move before the opposition actually occupies Mid, the task is done. In a few cases, the line can only be assembled with pieces ordered to move.

9. **Removals.** In one way, these are generally more important than builds, because there is more flexibility with removals than with builds. This is the time to get the proper mix of armies and fleets, and to assure that superfluous units are jettisoned first. An expanding power, racing to get to a stalemate line, will sometimes pay too much attention to what is needed to take a vital center rather than to what will be needed in the long run to hold the entire line. It does no good to maximize the probability of taking a vital center by building, say, an army, when you will need to get a fleet into place to hold the whole thing.

10. **Planning.** Richard Sharp said it best: "Bitter experience has convinced me that ad hoc solutions, devised on the run, simply don't work." Indeed, a single misstep -- failing to provide a retreat square for a piece in a vital area -- can deny you a line. Sometimes your eye will mistakenly be on a supply center, and not on the adjacent minor province, and your victory drive is stopped dead. "I'll worry about them when I get there" is too often the prelude to

a player who discovers that there is no there there. Other times, the line may be spotted, the pieces arranged, only to discover that X's army is sitting on Y's supply center. While players will sometimes have to deploy pieces far from the supply centers, if that center must be occupied to hold the line, only he can do it.

11. Raider. The most important tactical tool in preventing the formation of a stalemate line is the raider. The raider can do one or both of two things: 1) Seize a supply center (or two, or three) which is needed to support a unit vital for the stalemate line. 2) Cut an essential support needed for the stalemate line, or provide a new support for an attack on the stalemate line. But a raider is not necessarily fatal. There are many lines which guard a larger number of SCs than they need units to form it. If you have two extra units, you can afford to let the raider seize one SC, and dispatch one unit to simply follow the raider, attacking the raider's just captured SC every time he tries to take a second SC, so that the raider can never take more than one SC at a time. Dealing with the raider's direct disruption of the line is more complicated. This generally requires at least two fronts: one to attack the raider each season to prevent it from giving support, and the other to provide an additional support which may be needed, or to try to block the raider from moving into a vital spot. Unfortunately, there is likely to be more than one vital spot to guard, or more than one supporting unit which could be cut by the raider, so eventually the defenders will guess wrong, and the raider will have accomplished her task. Once a raider is lodged against the backside of the line, the defenders may be better off trying to squash the raider immediately by diverting a stalemate line unit for that task, even if it means giving the opposition a 50-50 chance of cracking the line. The advantage in this situation may go to the player who knows the stalemate lines best. The raider may head for a part of the line which is not critical, the line is cracked there because the defenders divert line units to squash it, and then the defenders fall back to another line that can still be held, albeit with fewer units. If the stalemate line happens to generate three extra units, the defenders will have an easier time of it, and may be able to corner the raider and snuff it out. Thus the first thing the defenders need to do is see how many extra units they have. If it's not enough, the next order of business may be to ignore the raider and try to push the line forward to obtain a new line which generates more extra units. In this regard, the fleet raider is a little less dangerous, because it is likely to be further from snatching a SC.

12. Oversized Lines. By long-standing convention, stalemate lines are considered those holding 17 or fewer centers. As such, they are only going to stop alliances, except for the 17 center stalemate line which can stop a single player. Otherwise, stopping a single player requires holding more than 17 centers. Attention is rarely given to such lines, but Randolph Smyth has described a series of these. Even more so than regular stalemate lines, these tend to involved two separate lines, converging on Switzerland. But these lines tend to be fairly easy to construct, and they usually require significantly fewer units than the supply centers they guard, so there is much more room for error. Of course, assembling the alliance structure and coordination mechanisms for such lines is another story entirely. This essay will stick entirely to lines which hold 17 or fewer centers.

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Put the kids away: what follows is not a pretty sight. There is no possible way this material can be made interesting; "Barely digestible" is the best one can hope for. The best single collection collection of these appears in Diplomacy Digest #10/11. Most (but definitely not all) of the material which appears here comes from there, and the issue includes much

more detail than I have included here. A and F designators have been omitted; they are inferable in all cases. Scan = Den, Nwy and Swe; Balk = Bul, Gre, Rum, Ser. These are generally minimal positions, that is, the lines which hold the least territory but still cannot be overrun. Expansions (to cover additional provinces) are usually possible; I've given a few examples of that. I've also tried to throw in a few strategic implications where possible.

EASTERN LINES

The simpler of the two categories of eastern lines requires that you hold all of R, T, Bud, Bul, Rum, Vie, Ber, Nwy and Swe, plus something else. If the something is Den and Germany, your line is StP & Ska S Nwy, Den S Hel, Kie & Mun S Ruhr, Boh & Vie S Tyo, Rum S Bud, Con S Bul, Eas S Aeg. Your second choice is to hold all of Austria and the Balkans. In that case, you have Bar S Nwy, Swe S Ska, Bot S Bal, Sil S Ber, Gal S Boh, Ser & Vie & Bud S Tri, Aeg S Gre, F Eas H. Your third choice is Den plus Ser. Then, you have Bar S Nwy, Bal & Ska S Den, Pru S Ber, Sil S Boh, Bud S Vie, Rum & Bul S Ser, Eas S Aeg. It is important to note how many fleets are required for these lines. In the north, you must have 3, 5, and 3 respectively. These will normally be mostly Russian fleets, and that requires some planning, plus either a compliant or a dead England. The only exception to this is in the last one. If you can expand A Pru to Mun, or Rum to Gre, you'll have an extra SC, allowing you to dispense with F Bar, and defend Nwy with Swe & StP S Nwy. The first position can be varied by exchanging Ser for either Nwy or Mun, but in both cases, you'll then need 4 northern fleets.

The other category of eastern lines finds you without StP, which is the usual situation if A or I or T, rather than Russia has dominated the east. You'll need the rest of Russia, plus T, A, Balk, and, with one exception, pieces of both Italy and Germany. That's a tall order, and it emphasizes how important StP is to the east too.

Might as well start with that exception. If you've managed to get both Nap and Rom, you don't need any of Germany --- the only eastern line with no need at all for Berlin. Apu & Nap S Rom, Eas S Ion locks up the south. Then Vie & Tri S Tyo, Gal & Boh S Sil, Ukr S War and Sev S Mos. If, however, the enemy has E Ven, you'll need F Adr also to pin it down. This is a very handy line for Austria, as it needs only two fleets --- what follows all require 3-5.

The other three lines all require Ber and Ven. If you have Nap, then Mos & War S Liv, Pru & Sil S Ber, Boh S Tyo, Tri & Adr S Ven, Apu S Nap, Aeg S Ion. Without Nap, you'll need Mun instead, and there are two different ways of doing it. If you've only got 4 southern fleets, the Adr S Apu, Aeg & Eas S Ion, Tyo & Tri S Ven, Sil & Boh S Mun, Pru S Ber, Mos & War S Liv, Vie H. If you have 5 southern fleets, you can dispense with Apu (i.e. you can assemble a line without taking Apu): Tyo & Tri & Adr S Ven, Alb & Aeg & Eas S Ion, Sil & Boh S Mun, Pru S Ber, Mos & War S Liv, Vie H.

In summary, Eastern lines are a fairly tidy affair. If you have StP, you need Nwy and Swe too, and normally 3-5 northern fleets, two southern fleets, plus most or all of everything east of Italy. If you don't have StP, all your fleets must be in the south, and you'll need, with one exception, three SCs of Italy and Germany. Finally, Ber must be held in all but one case.

SOUTHERN LINES

When we left the east, Italy was at most partially held. With all of Italy held, most or all of G/R can be dispensed with, to form the southern lines. One group of lines involve holding just A, I, T, Bul, Ser, Gre, and Tun. Naf & Tyh S Wes, Tus S Pie, Vie & Tyo S Boh, Ser S Bud, Arm S Bla, Bul H. If Germany is strong, you will be unlikely to have A Boh, so replace Boh and Tus with Pie S Lyo, Tri S Vie, Ven S Tyo, a line which requires at least 7 fleets. Alternatively, if you don't hold Bla, then: Ank S Arm, Con S Bul, Ser S Bud, Vie & Tyo S Boh, Pie S Lyo, Naf S Wes, Bud H. Notice that you must have either Boh or Bla (although if you have both, you don't need Lyo). Finally, if Vie is lost, you can compensate with Rum: Bul & Bla S Rum, Ser S Bud, Ven & Tri S Tyo, Pie S Lyo Naf S Wes, Arm & Tyo H.

If you can add Rum and Sev, a fantastic simplification can occur: Naf S Wes, Pie S Lyo, Tyr S Boh, Vie S Gal, Sev S Ukr. That's right --- 10 units hold 15 centers!!! That gives you tremendous flexibility in case you are short of units, need to bottle up or squash a raider, or want some spare units to pursue expansion possibilities. This is my personal favorite for Most Elegant Stalemate Line. It has an easy 6:4 A/F ratio, and only two pieces sit on SCs, making it easy to build. Note, however, that there is no flexibility in unit types --- duty requires either an army or fleet in each spot. This is an important line for Italy or I/A because its fairly easy to reach in midgame, especially if an R-T war breaks out.

A second group of lines allows the east to hold out even without Tunis, which is usually the situation if E/F have swept the rest of the board. Rum & Sev S Ukr, Ser S Bud, Alb S Tri, Ven & Tus S Pie, Nap & Ion S Tyh. Note that Vie is unessential, but if you do have it, Sev is not needed: Bla & Ser S Rum, Tri & Bud S Vie, Tus & Ven S Pie, Nap & Ion S Tyh, Arm H. But you must have either Vie or Sev if you lack Tun.

Moving further west, we find a final group of lines: those which hold Por and Spa. These show quite some variation. The first is the most bizarre stalemate line I know of, you are unlikely ever to see it: Por & Wes S Spa, Naf, Con & Arm H. This uses only T, Tun, Spa and Por for SCs. And only two support orders are needed for such scattered real estate! As it requires that I, F, A and R be unable to build fleets, it only has meaning if Turkey (or a Turkish alliance) is faced by E/G. If Rom and Nap are owned, add Apu S Rom; with Ven also, then Tus & Apu S Ven. If you also hold Bul, Gre and Ser, then Bul & Alb S Ser, Tus & Apu S Ven, Por & Wes S Spa, Arm H, Naf H. This has a spare unit (12 centers held by 11 pieces). You can cope with a living R in this line by adding Arm S Bla to that line.

Note that the above lines all have Spa & Por -- but not Mar. If you also have Mar, life is simpler: Por S Spa, Lyo S Mar, Pie S Ven, Alb & Bul S Ser, Arm, Wes & Naf H. This line has some offensive potential, e.g. Spa & Naf S Wes-Mid. Rum and Tri can be added to that line, giving greater offensive potential. If you do manage to take Mid and the rest of A, you can hold it with a unique line: Ank S Smy, Con & Bul(ec) S Bla, Bud S Sev, Vie & Tyo S Boh, Naf & Por S Mid, Mar & Ser H, and either Spa(sc) S Mid (if the enemy has F Gas) or Spa(sc) S Mar (if the enemy has A Gas). This holds 16 SCs with 16 units, but it can actually tolerate an enemy A/F Arm or A Syr. This is the only line that I am aware of which in some way splits Turkey. Alternatively, if you take Mid, you can hold it without all of Austria if instead you have all of France, i.e. F, I, T, Spa, Por, Tri, Gre, Ser, Bul: Bre & Par S Mid, Par S Pic, Gas & Mar S Bur, Ven & Alb S Tri, Bul S Ser, Arm S Bla, Pie H. This is very handy against a German or Russian led alliance, although whether it can really be considered a "southern" alliance is questionable.

Finally, there is one southern line which needs none of Italy, but holds T, Balk, Bud, Tri, Tun, Spa, and Por: Por & Wes S Spa, Adr & Alb S Tri, Ser S Bud, Bul S Rum, Bla or Arm S Sev. Extensions are possible to add Vie, or Ven & Rom, or Rom & Nap.

Southern lines are easier to generate than Eastern ones, as they usually require only 13 centers (or fewer). Eastern ones almost always need 16 or 17. This is largely due to all the units that Eastern lines need to either secure StP, or cope with not having it. By contrast, either blockading Gibraltar or securing Mid is much simpler. This is a factor in the Turkish (and to a lesser degree, Austrian) alliance structure. The alliance with Russia has enormous offensive potential, more so than, IT or AT. But it needs to go farther to reach the safety of a stalemate line.

WESTERN LINES

The title is somewhat of a misnomer --- it refers to countries, not positions. These are the lines which depend on control of the Mid from the northern side. We begin with the smallest possible stalemate line: F Por & F Iri (or Eng etc.) S F Mid. These three units hold E plus Por --- there's even a spare unit. Of course, F, G and R must all be unable to build against you. While it would be immensely satisfying to thwart a southern alliance with this, I don't know that it's ever been done. And because it holds so little real estate, it won't be able to stop a win if the opposing alliance is at all unbalanced. This can be expanded in two directions.

The first is southward, to hold E, F, Por and Spa: Pic & Par S Bur, Mar & Spa(sc) S Lyo, Naf S Wes. If 5 fleets aren't available, A Gas S A Mar replaces F Lyo, F Mar. Several extensions are possible from this. Push Par & Pic to Bel & Ruh for a 9th center, or forward to Hol S Ruh for 10 SCs with 8 units. With a 9th unit, you can run the line Den-Kie-Ruh-Bur for 12 SCs. If you lack Wes, the E, F, Por, Bel, Hol & Den are held with Ruh S Kie, Par & Pic S Bur, Eng & Por S Mid, Den H. These are extremely common lines for E or F or EF. Spa can be added to that with Por & Gas S Spa (Par now not needed), and expansions to cover Mar, or Mar & Mun are possible. Alternatively, the line can be expanded into Scan, holding E, F, Scan, Por, Bel, Hol, Kie with Swe S Nwy, Ruh S Kie, Par & Pic S Bur, Por & Eng S Mid, Kie H. Although the line has two spare units, StP cannot be taken against a strong and prepared east, since that requires four units for the assault.

Speaking of StP, the other major direction of expansion involves those which hold StP (but not Mos). The simplest of these is Por & Iri S Mid, Nwy S StP, Den H, locking up E, Scan, Por & StP. This is an extremely efficient line which has two units to spare. As a result, some opposition behind the lines can be coped with. Units in Fin or Bar can be boxed in (e.g. enemy F Bar with Nwg H, Fin S StP). Otherwise, expansions on the continent are possible: Nth & Hel S Hol, or Nth & Eng S Bel, Bel & Hel S Hol, or Nth S Hol, Den & Hel S Kie, etc. -- all taking advantage of those two extra units to support footholds. If an army can be pushed into Ruh, then the expansion runs to Den S Kie, Nth S Bel, Hol S Ruh, and from there, expansion to Spain is possible as discussed earlier. With Spa, one can hold Mun and Kie without Ber via: StP & Bal S Liv, Kie & Ruh & Bur S Mun, Gas S Mar, Iri S Mid, Por S Spa -- although slipping that unit into Liv is going to take some doing, and note that the very common F StP(nc) won't work in this line. If you need to hold Ber too, Fin S StP, Kie & Ruh S Mun, Bur S Gas, Bal S Ber, Eng & Por S Mid holds E, G, Scan, StP, Bel, Hol, Bre & Par. Expansions to

Spa and Mar are straightforward.

One final stalemate line --- an oddity which holds Mid without Por. E, F, G, Bel, Hol, Scan & StP can be held with NAT & Iri & Eng S Mid, Gas & Bur S Mar, Kie & Ruh S Mun, Bal S Ber, Nwy S StP. Although no sea space is as closely linked to a SC in stalemate lines as Mid-Por, there is this exception.

These are the most important lines for E, F, and G. They rely either on control of Mar-Por-Spa or Scan-StP, and both sets expand toward the lowlands and/or G in much the same manner. These are the easiest lines to reach, and consequently probably form the most common category.

WESTERN LINES FACING ENEMY FLEETS

With one minor exception, the previous lines required the absence of fleets outside the Med. But Western lines are so strong that some can even cope with their presence. You need to have E, F, Por, Spa, Bel, Hol, Den, Nwy and 2-4 other SCs. These are fairly complicated, and generally of two types. If you cannot actually get into the Med, then all you can cope with is the enemy holding Ber or Ber & Mun. In both cases, you need the rest of G, Swe, and StP. In the enemy-in-Berlin case, you do Bot & Den S Bal, Nwy S StP, Kie & Ruh & Bur S Mun, Gas S Mar, Por S Spa, Bre S Mid. In the other case, Fin & Nwy S StP, Ska S Swe, Den & Ruh S Kie, Gas S Mar, Por S Spa, Bre S Mid, Bur H.

On the other hand, if you've got Wes, you can stand the loss of even more in the northeast. For example, if the enemy has Ber & Bot, you must also hold the rest of G, Scan & StP. Do the following: StP-Liv, Bar & Fin S Nwy-StP, Swe & Den S Bal, Ruh & Bur S Mun, Gas S Mar, Naf & Spa(sc) S Wes, and either A Kie S Mun if the enemy has A Ber (and could attack Mun) or Kie-Ber if it's E Ber (to foil Bot & Ber S Liv-Bal). Notice that it won't work if you have F StP(nc). If the enemy holds more than 2 northern centers, expansion to Tun is needed, and if you don't have F Bar, all of Italy must be overrun, with simplifications available if Russia cannot get StP(nc), etc., etc. These lines can be subject to complicated requirements. But it is important to note that you can cope with an enemy foothold in the northeast by expanding in the south, because those enemy holdings may themselves constitute a stalemate line, so you can't dislodge them.

All this may strike you as very hypothetical and pointless, but it is not (we'll get to the truly pointless lines shortly!). Remember, we saw earlier in the eastern stalemate lines that the east must always involve Ber as part of their line, and often have StP as well. If they have been clever enough to retain a fleet up there, you will need to take precautions --- but the lines can be assembled.

NORTHERN LINES

These are lines not requiring control of Mid, and not easy to organize, alas. The first set all have the Eng-Iri-Nat fleet wall and usually require at a minimum E, Hol, Scan, Kie, StP, and with one exception, Bre and Par. This calls for Eng S Bre, Par & Ruh S Bur, Den S Kie, Nwy S StP, Iri & Nat H. This can be varied by trading A Den for Bal & Kie S A Ber. Even the loss of StP can be coped with, as Swe S Nwy will lock it up. Alternatively, Bel can be added by adding Pic S Par, Bel S Ruh and dropping Bur. Next, if you hold all of G, a new line is possible: Eng S Bre, Par S Bur, Kie & Ruh S Mun, Bal S Ber, Nwy S StP, Iri & Nat H. From here, expansions are possible into Russia (e.g. Pru H, Liv S Mos, or Pru & Liv S War, or both: Pru S War, StP S Mos). Moreover, if you get down as far as Ukr, Mos and Ber can be held via Ber S Sil, Mos & War S Ukr, with units in Pru & StP no longer needed. This stalemate line hold 16 centers with only 13 units, meaning that you can sustain losses elsewhere. For example, with no Par, you can fall back to Eng & Pic S Bre, Bel & Ruh S Bur, NAT & Iri H. Otherwise, the Eng-Bre-Par-Bur-Mun-Ber line is fine. If you can reach both Gas and Boh, those 16 centers can be held with only 12 units: Bre & Bur S Gas, Mun & Sil S Boh, War & Mos S Ukr, Eng & Iri & NAT H. This can be varied to cope with a vacant Eng to give an extremely active line: Mun & Sil S Boh, Liv S War, StP S Mos, A Par S A Pic-Bur, A Bur-Gas, Bre-Eng, Iri-Eng, NAT-Mid. Finally, the one exception mentioned at the start: E, G, Bel, Hol, Scan, Mos, StP and War (i.e. no F at all) can be held with Iri & Nth S Eng, NAT H, Hol S Bel, Ruh & Kie S Mun, Ber S Sil, War & Mos S Ukr.

The second set is a complicated series of almost desperate lines in which the enemy actually has a purchase on England proper. There are 7 rather unrelated lines, so only a few will be given as representative. If the enemy has exactly A Wal, A Cly, F Lpl, you can counter with Bre & Bur S Gas, Mun & Sil S Boh, War & Mos S Ukr, Edi S Nwg - Cly, Eng & Yor S Lon-Wal, Nth S Eng. These odd maneuvers are done to prevent the enemy from switching the units in e.g. Cly and Lpl, which would result in the escape of the enemy fleet. If Iri is vacant and there is enemy A Lon, A Yor, F Wal: Cly-NAT, F Eng S NAT-Iri, F Nth S F Eng, A Edi S Lpl, continent the same. If there are enemy units in Both Lon and Wal, you'll need F Bre this time: NAT-Iri, Eng-Iri, Bre-Mid, Nth-Lon, Lpl-Wal, Yor-Wal, Par & Bur S Gas, Mun & Sil S Boh, War & Mos S Ukr. With 6 pieces ordered to move, it is the most dynamic line I know of and the only one with two self-standoffs. Other lines deal with circumstances where there is just an enemy unit in Cly, or just in Wales, or enemy fleets in Wal and Lpl. And most preposterously improbable of all, one line copes with enemy armies in Lon, Wal and Yor, but no fleets anywhere around! These lines don't seem to be related to any other lines. So far as I am aware, these lines, composed by John Basher, were the most recent (1978) set of significant stalemate lines to be discovered (or created if you prefer), and overturned the previous orthodoxy that all stalemate lines required at least all the E or all the T home centers or both.

CRESCENT LINES

Except for those of the last paragraph, all previous lines have been supported by either E or T home centers. The crescent lines are supported by both T and some or all of the E home centers. These can arc either through the northeast or the southwest.

In the former case, start with T, E, Nwy, StP, Swe, and Por: Eas & Con S Aeg, Nwy (or Bar, etc.) S StP, Por & Iri S Mid, Swe & Arm H. StP can be exchanged for Den (i.e. Den H,

Swe S Nwy). If both are held, you don't even need Aeg, and can instead do Syr S Smy, Bla S Con, Arm H. If you want to add Mos and Sev, then StP S Liv, Mos & Sev S Ukr is added to that Aeg-less line. The same 13 centers can be held with a somewhat different line: Arm S Sev, StP & Liv S Mos, Bal S Liv, Con & Eas S Aeg, Iri & Por S Mid; Den & Con H --- here you have Aeg in place of Ukr. But if you have both, Bal can be dispensed with: StP S Liv, Mos & Sev S Ukr. Alternatively, War can be added, using Liv & Mos S War, Sev S Ukr. Expansions to Rum and Bul are possible.

The SW lines are much more varied. The barest of these is a freakish line which holds only E, T and Por: Por & Iri S Mid, Con & Eas S Aeg, Arm H. Note that a western SC is supporting a southern unit here. No enemy fleets outside the Med basin can be tolerated.

The next expansion from this is a colossal jump: E, T, F, I, Por, Spa, and Tun, as I know of no intermediate lines between those two. Cly S Edi, Lon S Eng, Pic & Mar S Bur, Pie S Ven, Con & Arm S Bla, Yor & NAT H. As this line has a spare unit, the loss of Bla can be coped with by adding a unit in Ank to give Ank S Con, Smy (or Syr) S Arm. Bel can be added in either case with Eng & Pic S Bel. Or, if you are very short of armies, it can be done with NAT S Nwg, Edi & Yor S Nth, Lon & Eng S Nth, Bel & Bur S Ruh, Pie S Ven, Con & Arm S Bla; again, the loss of Bla can be coped with. These lines are basically against an RG alliance, because no Austrian units can be dealt with, owing to the fact that this has only one spare unit. If Hol can be added, the line contracts to Nwg-Nth-Hel-Hol-Ruh, which is so efficient that it has three extra units, so that even F Bla or F Tri could be coped with. The latter is via F Ion S A Alb, F Adr H.

In addition, there are a few lines available if a piece of England has been lost. Holding F, I, T, Spa, Por, Tun, Lpl and Lon, you can cope with the loss of Edi with NAT S Cly, Lpl S Yor, Lon S Eng, Pic & Mar S Bur, Pie S Ven, Arm & Con S Bla. This is a very hard line to achieve, because every unit except Cly and Yor is locked into a particular A/F type --- if you have for example, F Pie, all is lost. Further no southern fleets can be coped with; even enemy F Tri would require adding Gre, Ser and Bul as SCs, and shifting the above units considerably. However, if you have Bel, Gre, Ser and Bul to add, you can cope with the loss of both Lpl and Edi, for this 17-center line: Mid S Iri, Wal & Lon S Yor, Eng & Pic S Bel, Mar S Bur, Pie S Ven, Alb & Bul S Ser, Arm S Bla, Bul H. Because of its tremendous length, the line cannot be reduced even to 16 centers.

In most cases, the SW crescent lines will be held by an alliance, but at least for the larger ones, Italy alone can possibly construct them, especially if she has been relentless in expanding her fleets. More likely is E or F or both allied with I or T or both. The NE lines are even less likely to be formed by a single power. England normally cannot take a Turkish home center, let alone all three. Russia could construct such a line, but taking Por would be an extraordinary feat. E-T is the most likely choice.

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Finally, credit should be given to the people most responsible for systematizing the various types of stalemate lines: John Beshera, Eric Verheiden, and Robert Lipton. Most of the stalemate lines in this essay were first published in Graustark, and nearly all the material appeared in 1972-1975.

THIS ESSAY IS DEDICATED TO MY TWO CHILDREN, JOSHUA AND EZRA. MAY THEY LIVE TO SEE THE DAY WHEN THE WORD "WAR" IS INEVITABLY FOLLOWED BY THE WORD "GAME".

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THIS ESSAY IS DEDICATED TO
THOSE WHO HAVE TO SEE
NEEDS THAT ARE NOT MET

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