

IN THIS ISSUE: An article by Stephen Gordon on Diplomacy as a simulation of international relations.

GRAUSTARK

#141

1965Q, 1966R, 1968AA, 1967U, 1967V

7 October 1967

1967U

"Fall 1904"

FRANCE FLAT BUSTED

ENGLAND (Maloney): F Gly-Edi; F Liv holds; F Lon-Yor.

FRANCE (Gemignani): "A Bur retreats to Paris"; this was not possible because an Italian army was then in Paris; A Pic-Bel; A Par S A Pic-Bel. These moves not only fail, but couldn't have happened in the first place, because the French units are A Gas, F Pic.

GERMANY (M. Miller): F North Sea C RUSSIAN A Norway-Yor; A Edi S RUSSIAN A Norway-Yor; F Bel-Pic; A Mun-Tyr; A Bur-Par; A Ruh-Bur.

ITALY (Clark): A Par-Bre; F Eng S A Par-Bre; F Spa(s.c.) holds; A Mar-Gas; A Tri-Vie.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Latimer): A Vie S A Bud; A Bud S A Vie; A Alb-Tri; F Gre-Ion.

RUSSIA (G. Heap): F Norwegian Sea-North Atlantic; A Norway-Yor; F Ska-Norway; A Gal-Bud; A Rum S A Gal-Bud; F Sev S A Rum; A Boh-Vie.

TURKEY (Beshara): F Smy-Aeg; A Ank-Bul; F Bla C A Ank-Bul; A Ser S AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN A Alb-Tri.

Underlined moves are not possible. The High Combatant Powers now control the following supply centers:

ENGLAND: Liv, Lon. (2)

GERMANY: Bel, Ber, Den, Edi, Hol, Kie, Mun, Par. (8)

ITALY: Bre, Mar, Nap, Rom, Spa, Tun, Ven. (7)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Gre, Tri, Vie. (3)

RUSSIA: Bud, Mos, Nor, Rum, St.P, Sev, Swe, War. (8)

TURKEY: Ank, Bul, Con, Ser, Smy. (5)

Italy retreats A Tri-Vie, and the Austro-Hungarian A Bud is annihilated. Germany and Italy may each build 2 new units, and

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1967V

"Fall-Winter 1903"

RUSSIA STEPPES OUT

ENGLAND (Lebling): F Tri-Eng; F Lon-North Sea; F Hel-Hol.

FRANCE (Prosnitz): A Bel S ENGLISH F Hel-Hol; A Pic-Bur; F Bre-Eng; F Mid S F Bre-Eng; F Mar-Lyo; A Spa-Mar.

GERMANY (M. Thomson): A Fin-St.P; F Norway S A Fin-St.P; A Swe-Den; F Bal-Bot; F Den-Kie; A Sil-War; A Hol S FRENCH A Bel.

ITALY (Griffin): F Ion holds; F Apu S F Ion; A Rom-Ven.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (H. Anderson): A Rum & A Ven hold; A Bud S A Rum; A Tyr S A Ven; F Tri-Adr.

RUSSIA (Gordon): No moves received. F Bot, A Ukr, & A Gal hold. F St.P(s.c.) dislodged and annihilated.

TURKEY (S. Heap): F Aeg-Ion; F Gre S F Aeg-Ion; F Bla-Sev; A Sev-Mos; A Bul S AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN A Rum.

Underlined moves are not possible. Germany retreats A Hol-Ruh. The High Combatant Powers now control the following supply centers:

ENGLAND: Edi, Hol, Liv, Lon. (4)

FRANCE: Bel, Bre, Mar, Par, Por, Spa. (6)

GERMANY: Ber, Den, Kie, Mun, Nor, St.P, Swe, War. (8)

ITALY: Nap, Rom, Tun. (3)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Bud, Rum, Ser, Tri, Ven, Vie. (6)

TURKEY: Ank, Bul, Con, Gre, Mos, Sev, Smy. (7)

Eugene Prosnitz replaces Frank Musbach as France, since Musbach missed two moves in succession. "Winter 1903" moves are:

ENGLAND: Builds F Edi.

GERMANY: Builds A Mun.

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1965Q

"Fall 1918"

STILL NO CHANGE; ARMISTICE NEAR

ENGLAND (Koning): F Mid, F North Sea, F Bal, A Mar, & A Ukr hold; F Bre, F Iri, & F Eng S F Mid; A Mos & A War S A Ukr; A Ber S A Sil; A Sil & A Ruh S AUSTRIO-HUNGARIAN A Mun; A Gas & A Bur S A Mar; A Den-Kie.

FRANCE (Linden): F Spa(s.c.) S TURKISH A Pie-Mar.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (K. Pattee): No move received. A Mun holds.

TURKEY (Kuch): A Rum-Ukr; A Sev & A Gal S A Rum-Ukr; A Arm S A Sev; A Bul holds; F Bla-Rum; A Ser-Tri; A Bud & A Boh S A Gal; A Tyr S A Boh; A Pie-Mar; F Lyo S A Pie-Mar; F Tus-Pie; F Wes & F Por S FRENCH F Spa(s.c.); F North Africa-Mid.

Underlined moves are not possible. The High Combatant Powers hold the same supply centers as they did at the end of "1916" and "1917". (See GRAUSTARK #136.) The deadline for "Spring 1919" moves is NOON, SATURDAY 21 OCTOBER 1967.

GENEVA (AP): Riots broke out in this and other European cities after Spiros Preposterous' revelation that he has been, by judicious use of pseudonyms, controlling the military actions of all other Great Powers in World War '65Q. He even hinted that, as Eric Preposterous, he has been guiding the destinies of the various English forces. "Have you noticed," he said, "how little actual armed conflict there has been between England and Turkey?" He ventured the opinion, however, that neutral observers should have seen through the ruse by studying the actions of Germany. "Control over German units was clearly Preposterous," he said.

Word comes from Pennsylvania of a movement to bar Preposterous from all future wars. It is suspected, however, that this is also the work of Preposterous.

In Gopher Prairie, Canada, the only voice of reason was raised. "How do we know," John Metsect asked, "that the world did not know of Preposterous' actions? How do we know that the Great Gamesmaster in the sky was not informed?" So saying, he wrote everyone in Europe, and prayed.

1966R

"Spring 1915"

TURKEY BECOMES FIFTH NATION TO OCCUPY MUNICH

FRANCE (Berman): No moves received. F Bre, F Tun, F Lyo, F Norway, A Hol, F Spa(s.c.), F Mar, F Wes, F Mid, A St.P, F Bar, A Kie, A Ruh, A Bur, F Bal, & F Bot hold. A Mun dislodged and annihilated.

RUSSIA (Levinson): A Ber S TURKISH A Tyr-Mun; A Mos S TURKISH A Liv.

TURKEY (Wagner): A Gal & A Boh S A Sil; A Ukr & A Sev S RUSSIAN A Mos; A Liv S A Pru; A Tyr-Mun; A Pie & F Tyr S F Tus; F Tus S A Pie; F Nap & F Ion S F Tyr; F Aeg S F Ion; A Pru & A Sil S RUSSIAN A Ber; A War S A Liv.

This is

The deadline for "Fall 1915" moves is NOON, SATURDAY 21 OCTOBER 1967.

ABOARD H. I. M. S. ISSACHAR ZEBULONOVICH. (Feb. 15, 1915; PNA): A fisherman picked up by the commerce raider Michael Strogoff has related some horrible stories of conditions in St. Petersburg under the French occupation.

On January 15, the garrison commander ordered the impounding of all household pets. They were to be used as food for the French, who, as everyone knows, will eat anything. Children trying to defend their dogs and cats were shot.

On the 18th, partisans broke into the French supply depot. The next morning, the quartermaster found the freezer full, but each of the packages, neatly wrapped in butcher's paper, contained a piece of a French soldier. It was estimated that at least thirty bodies were there.

O At
P Great
E Intervals
R This
A Appears
T To
I Inflamm
O Optic
N Nerves

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LUCREZIA'S ARMIES FORCIBLY ADMINISTER BORDSHABLAZIN TO SULTAN'S HAREM

ENGLAND (Dygart): F Mid-Por; F North Atlantic-Mid; F Cly-Edi ((sic; no such unit exists F Iri-Mid ((sic; no such unit exists)); F Wes-Tun ((sic; no such unit exists)); F Wal not ordered, holds.

GERMANY (Latimer): F Lon-Wal; F Liv S F Lon-Wal; F Bel-Eng; F North Sea S F Bel-Eng; F Edi, A Bre, A Norway, A Ruh, & A Nap hold; A Mar-Spa; A War-Mos; A Spa-Por; A Kie-Ber; A Apu S A Nap.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Walker): F Ion-Eas; A Bul-Con; F Aeg S A Bul-Con; A Ser-Bul; F Gre S A Ser-Bul; A Rom S A Ven; A Ven S A Rom; A Rum & A Mun hold; A Gal S A Rum.

RUSSIA (Turner): F Sev-Bla.

TURKEY (E. Thompson): F Bla-Bul; A Con S F Bla-Bul.

*Underlined moves are not possible. England retreats F Wal-Iri. Turkey must retreat A Con-Smy or A Con-Ank. The direction of this retreat must be submitted with the "Winter 1912" builds and removals, which may be made conditional upon it. The High Combatant Powers now control the following supply centers:

ENGLAND: <u>Por</u> , <u>Tun</u> . (2)	AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: <u>Bud</u> , <u>Bul</u> , <u>Con</u> , <u>Gre</u> , <u>Mun</u> ,
GERMANY: <u>Bel</u> , <u>Ber</u> , <u>Bre</u> , <u>Den</u> , <u>Edi</u> , <u>Hol</u> , <u>Kie</u> ,	<u>Rom</u> , <u>Rum</u> , <u>Ser</u> , <u>Tri</u> , <u>Ven</u> , <u>Vie</u> . (11)
<u>Liv</u> , <u>Lon</u> , <u>Mar</u> , <u>Mos</u> , <u>Nap</u> , <u>Nor</u> , <u>Par</u> , <u>St.P</u> ,	RUSSIA: <u>Sev</u> . (1)
<u>Spa</u> , <u>Swe</u> , <u>War</u> . (18)	TURKEY: <u>Ank</u> , <u>Smy</u> . (2)

Austria-Hungary may build one new unit, and England must remove one unit. Germany now has four fewer units than supply centers, but may build only one unit, since only one home supply center is free. The deadline for these "Winter 1912" moves is SATURDAY 21 OCTOBER 1967.

ANKARA: From the beginning Turkey knew of Austria-Hungary's threat to world peace.

SALONA (21 Oct. 1912): In the midst of this year's smashing Natal Orgy of Her Imperial Majesty and Her Holiness Lucrezia/Joan II, the Imperial Ministry of Truth issued an official denial of any and all rumors being circulated by the Nasty Leftist Press of Brooklyn. Her Majesty's is still holding 5-minute Instant Audiences.

SALONA (13 Nov. 1912) Official Statement: Congratulations to Germany on impending victory! Die, England and Turkey! Die!! DIE!!!

ANKARA: Shipyards here are preparing to build another fleet. Russia will be destroyed before all else, for her attacks on the Black Sea cannot go unanswered.

ST. PETERIGRAD: Jose Cardinal Peericelli today announced his resignation from the Sacred Congregations of Sacraments, of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, and of the Holy Office. Peericelli, now well beyond the age for retirement, is reported to have been appointed as Curia director for a specially created Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Truth. The new Congregation is designed to counteract the increasing anti-Catholic attitude prevalent in the newer sects. Peericelli, a master of debate and rhetoric, is expected to bring his master's touch to this highly sensitive post. Peericelli is now directly under the authority of His Holiness, Uriah IV, and is known for his intimate relations with the Vatican hierarchy.

Peericelli announced that his first mission would be the delivery of a major encyclical, Diminius Amicus Mortae Decredo, to a special gathering of the Grand Sevastopol Diplomacy Tournament, where Peericelli was scheduled to play England. Unfortunately, Peericelli, busy on important church affairs, had no time for this nonsense. (He was delivering a major address to the United Free Evangelical Ecumenical Conference of Pikes and Heretics.) His place has been taken by the beautiful Countess Debraira von Hotsendorff, who proceeded to charm the other players into all sorts of foolishness.

BROOKLYN: The Pulp Hacks United for Creativity today filed suit against the publishing executive Mutinus Nightstand and Mrs. Eallabalua, alias Princess Svetsoxa, for payment for the Princess' memoirs, which they claim to have written. Mr. Nightstand insisted that the memoirs are the Princess' own works. The Princess, absent at her stevedore's job, was unavailable for comment.

CURRENT ADDRESSES AND PHONE NUMBERS OF PLAYERS IN GRAUSTARK GAMES

1965Q

ENGLAND: John Koning, Apt. 1, 2008 Sherman Ave., Evanston, Ill. 60201; 312-491-9383.
 FRANCE: William Lee Linden, 83-33 Austin St., Kew Gardens, N. Y. 11415; 212-441-2729.
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Kim Pattee, 537 Warren Road, McDonald, Ohio 44437.
 TURKEY: Dr. Terry Kuch, 2323 Nebraska Ave., Washington, D. C. 20016; 301-244-8946.

1966R

FRANCE: Don Berman, 1860 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y. 11225; 212-UL 6-7863.
 RUSSIA: Kenneth Levinson, 1991 Sedgewick Ave., Bronx, N. Y. 10453; 212-LU 3-1846.
 TURKEY: SSgt. C. R. Wagner, Box 6008, APO San Francisco, Calif. 96328.

1966AA

ENGLAND: George Lincoln Dygert, 2090 Blackwood Dr., Walnut Creek, Calif. 94596.
 GERMANY: James Latimer, Room 265, Austin Centre, Merrimack College, North Andover, Mass. 01845; 617-689-9412, or 617-689-9403.
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Capt. R. J. Walker, 3345th Technical Training School (SAFM), Chanute AFB, Ill. 61866.
 RUSSIA: Charles Turner, 24 Boyd Court, Pleasant Hill, Calif. 94523.
 TURKEY: Earl Thompson, Apt. #2, 128 S. Mariposa, Los Angeles, Calif. 90004
 1st STANDBY: Tom Griffin, 115 E. 9th St., New York, N. Y. 10003; 212-GR 5-1465.
 2nd STANDBY: Margaret Gemignani, 508 S. St. Andrews Pl., Los Angeles, Calif. 90005.

1967F

ENGLAND: Hal Naus, 288 Broadway #139, Chula Vista, Calif. 92010; 714-420-9619.
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY & TURKEY: David Lebling, Box 2234, Burton House, 420 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

1967U

ENGLAND: Robert Maloney, 33-46 92nd St., Jackson Heights, N. Y. 11372; 212-QL 1-6288.
 GERMANY: Michael Miller, 9611 Watts Branch Dr., Rockville, Md. 20850; 301-762-4365.
 ITALY: Frank Clark, 5506 Fiske Pl., Alexandria, Va. 22312; 301-FL 4-9077.
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: James Latimer (see 1966AA above).
 RUSSIA: George Heap, Box 1487, Rochester, N. Y. 14603; 716-436-9169.
 TURKEY: John Beshara, Apt. 1021, 155 W. 68th St., New York, N. Y.; 212-724-4352.
 1st STANDBY: Dr. Terry Kuch (see 1965Q above).
 2nd STANDBY: Hal Naus (see 1967F above).

1967V

ENGLAND: David Lebling (see 1967F above).
 FRANCE: Eugene Prosnitz, 200 Clinton St., Brooklyn, N. Y. 11201; 212-UL 5-0089.
 GERMANY: Mehren Thomson Jr., 3612 E. Huron River Dr., Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104.
 ITALY: Tom Griffin (see 1966AA above).
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Hugh Anderson, 2717 Belaire Dr., Lansing, Mich. 48910.
 TURKEY: Sherry Heap, Box 1487, Rochester, N. Y. 14603; 716-436-9169.
 1st STANDBY: A3U Mark E. Johnson, AF 11 756 634, SQ-3757, Box B-7606, OMR-2, Sheppard AFB, Texas 76311.
 2nd STANDBY: Dr. Terry Kuch (see 1965Q above).

Players who have not yet sent in their phone numbers are requested to do so.

1967V (continued from p. 1)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Builds A Tri.
 RUSSIA: Out of game. All remaining units removed for lack of supply centers.
 TURKEY: Builds F Sny, F Con.

The deadline for "Spring 1964" moves is NOON, SATURDAY 21 OCTOBER 1967. This publication is not edited under the supervision of Bangs Leslie Tapacott.

A SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SIMULATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by Stephen Gordon

When attempting a study on simulation in international relations, the first obstacle that one has to cross is the lack of information that is available on the general principles of the field. There are numerous articles on the specific aspects of simulation. There are also a number of articles that discuss actual simulations. As a point of fact, however, a great deal of simulations that have been developed are inaccessible, in that they have not been published. Most of the simulations that are discussed have been printed in mimeographed form, and in order to obtain them it would be necessary to deal with the authors on a first-hand basis.

In lieu of the above factors, this study will discuss simulation using Simulation in International Relations by Harold Guetzkow et al. (Prentice-Hall, 1963), Simulation in Social Sciences by Harold Guetzkow (Prentice-Hall, 1962), and International Behavior by Herbert Kellman (Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1966), as the main sources. The former two discuss the topic directly, while the latter discusses simulation as one aspect of inter-nation relationships.

The study of international relations is sometimes considered a dubious field of endeavor, in that at the end of any given period of inquiry, the investigators will not have come to any concrete conclusions, and, more often than not, it is difficult for the students of international relations to agree on the premises for any conclusion. In spite of the fact that this is a problem that faces all of the practitioners of all of the theoretical disciplines, the "goldfish bowl effect" which surrounds the study of international relations makes the problem somewhat more pronounced. Aside from the technical advantages of simulation, which will be discussed later, I feel that the political scientist had to evolve the usage of some sort of experimental (or in this case quasi-experimental) technique, in order for the discipline to produce results on a more factual and concrete level. I feel, therefore, that the advent of simulation came, at least partially, from an attempt by the political science community to elevate its position. Regardless of the factors contributing to its conception, today simulation is able to stand on its own merits as a useful field of endeavor.

The necessity of simulation lies in several factors. The first involves the rapidity of technological advances (e. g., the advent of inter-continental ballistic missiles, the possibility of an anti-missile missile, the spread of nuclear arms to a fifth or sixth nation, etc.) As Snyder suggests, there is a "need for relatively quick insights that have no apparent counterpart in prior existence." (1) Directly related to this idea is the present usage of computers as a vehicle for simulation. In that contemporary computers can handle a large number of variables, the necessity of speed in determining decision-making outcomes is fulfilled.

Due to the large scope of international relations, it is virtually impossible to recreate or prognosticate about the actual events of a given situation. Whenever it is physically possible to do so, it is usually economically unattractive. Although simulation does not claim to recreate actual situations in the laboratory, it is the closest, and probably the best way of circumventing the reality problem.

The fourth and probably best reason for using simulation is that it allows the experimenter to observe what is going on. The complexities of an international system make it extremely difficult for the researcher to figure out exactly what is going on within it. As Snyder points out, "...structure, especially in large scale social interactions, is notably invisible. In the laboratory, not only can objective properties of structure, e. g. the direction, frequency, and content of communication, be counted and analyzed, but the subjective properties, e. g. the perceptions, evaluations, and choices of participants in the structure, are more readily accessible." (2) He goes on to say,

(1) Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel, and Richard C. Snyder, Simulation in International Relations (Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 3.

(2) ibid. p. 8.

"to see is not to discover, of course, but...one is much more likely to discover by means of a first-hand encounter with phenomena than by armchair speculation or deductive analysis." (3)

Having gone into some of the reasons for the use of simulation, it is necessary to describe certain pertinent concepts of simulation, which are important in gaining an understanding of the field. To begin with, simulation is not to be thought of as experimentation in the strictest sense of the word. I have referred to simulation as being "quasi-experimental". (4) In order for something to meet with the specifications of strict experimentation, it has to have certain prerequisites. To begin with, there has to be a control group used as a source of verification. In none of the simulations which I came across was a control group used. This is not to be interpreted as being a flaw in simulation, however. In actuality, simulation is used as a method of discovery. In strict experimentation, verification is the primary purpose, and discovery is an important, but secondary purpose. In simulation the starting point is not a hypothesis. Quite to the contrary, the starting point of simulation is the reproduction of actual events and processes. The hypothesis, if any at all, is that the outcome is completely in doubt, and a "let's wait and see" attitude is guiding the simulator.

The second concept that is necessary to understand, is that in any given simulation, the choice and usage of the variants is a sampling procedure. (5) This implies that at any given moment there is no set pattern as to what variant is going to be used, and in what way the variant will be used. This procedure (varying in flexibility from simulation to simulation) reinforces the basic idea of unknown responses being the basis of the results of the simulation. One of the interesting aspects of simulation is that the success, or credibility of a simulation, rests as much on the simulator's usage of variants, as on his choice of variants. If at any given moment the simulator wants to see the result of a particular turn of events it is necessary for him to alter and add to the variants, in accordance with the pressures that are already working on the participants. It would indeed be irrational for the researcher to add the variant of war between two nations, if prior to that segment of the simulation there were totally harmonious relations. Kellman states, "It is necessary to incorporate into the laboratory situation the significant conditions of the international situation that affect the way the experimental variable under study is likely to function." (6)

There have been several significant differences pointed out between reality and simulation. Kellman lists them as follows: (7)

- 1) The participants are usually students that are without either the experience or the responsibility of actual decision-makers.
- 2) It is a make-believe situation, in which little is at stake.
- 3) The levels of stress and involvement are considerably attenuated.
- 4) Interaction is simplified, and time is highly compressed.

In response to these questionable features of simulation, the following observations should be made.

Although the participants know that they are not making decisions in actual situations, "their behavior produces effects which in turn cause a 'shock of recognition' of real world likenesses." (8) Snyder notes that there were startling similarities of basic themes which appear, and even identical words employed by inexperienced subjects, as compared to diplomatic messages or other revealed official sources. (9)

In all of the simulations that I have studied, except for the ones that were strictly computerized, it was noted that there was a high degree of tension. This can be interpreted as meaning that, although there is a minimum of "real" outcomes and re-

(3) ibid. p. 8.

(4) ibid. p. 6.

(5) Herbert Kellman, International Behavior (Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 595.

(6) ibid. p. 597.

(7) ibid. pp. 596-7.

(8) Harold Gretzkow, op. cit., Simulation in International Relations, p. 13.

(9) ibid. p. 10.

ward, the participants put a great deal of importance on the outcomes of the simulation. In Diplomacy I have always found that tensions and tempers are always in an upsurge when a significant action is taking place. In a Diplomacy game there are no strict laboratory conditions, and in fact, in any game, the participants realize that it is only a game, and that it is probably one game in many. In the scientific simulations, however, the participants are usually engaged in the game with the knowledge that their moves and results are being carefully noted. If in Diplomacy the importance of the outcomes are evident, I would imagine that in actual laboratory simulation the importance placed on the outcomes would be proportionately greater, and therefore proportionately more significant to both the subject and the simulator.

In relation to the question of whether or not there is an effect on the outcome when there are real rewards and costs, M. J. Driver notes that there is no appreciable change in the outcomes when there is a change in the monetary incentives, (10) which leads one to believe that the simulation is both intrinsically satisfying and important to the subjects.

The reality/simulation dichotomy is not as serious a problem as might be thought. The experiment does not have to look like the "real world" at all. "What is important is the question of whether or not it operates like the world in the respects that are relevant in the study at hand." (11) An example of this idea can be found in a simulation whose goal is to find out what the effects of internal unrest has upon an external decision-making process. This behavioral problem can be easily simulated in the laboratory. The relevance of the results would be in proportion to the accuracy and proficiency of the experiment.

Before going into some actual simulations, there is one last point that should be made about simulations in general. Snyder states that there is a connection between play-acting and hypnosis. "Throwing one's self into a dramatic role apparently creates a psychic state not unlike a trance...Getting so caught up in a contrived situation that one does behave in accordance with system rules or constants and in response to unfolding interactions, rather than in accordance with personal whim, may be analogous to the inability of a hypnotized subject to lower his outstretched arm even when he feels quite free to do so." (12)

Kellman divides simulations into three types of experimental studies. (13) The first type is the inter-nation simulation. These simulations are the most interesting ones, to the observer, in that they try to approximate reality the most. I will give samples of these latter. The second type of simulation is the two-man game. The two-man game "...is so structured that mixed (cooperative and competitive) functions are brought into play. Choices of strategy in this type of conflict situation, processes of explicit and tacit bargaining, and outcomes for each party can be observed in these experiments." (14) In accordance with the theory that an imitation of reality is not necessary for accuracy, this type of simulation can examine the use of such behavioral variables as payoffs, communications, threats, etc. The third type of simulation involves the psychological investigation of inter-group conflicts. It studies its manifestations and its resolutions in deliberately devised laboratory or field situations (15) Here again, these experiments can be related to international relations, in spite of the lack of an inter-nation situation.

Oliver Benson's computer simulation is the first one that I am going to discuss. Benson (16) divided his variables into two categories, action variables and situation variables. Included in the action variables were nine acting nations (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Italy, India, China, and Japan),

(10) M. J. Driver, Conceptual Processes and Group Structures in an Inter-Nation Simulation (Educational and Testing Service & Princeton University, 1962), p. 76.

(11) S. Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 502.

(12) Guetzkow, op. cit., Simulation in International Relations, p. 14.

(13) Kellman, Op. cit., p. 14.

(14) ibid., p. 16.

(15) ibid., p. 17.

(16) Guetzkow, op. cit., Simulation in International Relations, pp. 197-200.

nine target states (Korea, Guatemala, Egypt, Lebanon, Hungary, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Iran), and nine intensity levels of action (these were rated from .100 to .900, and were labeled Diplomatic Protest (.100) straight through to all-out war (.900)). The situational variables included such items as national power based on war potential, distribution of the power, the degree of involvement of one state with another, and the propensity to act of each actor state.

In this simulation Benson assumes that the relationship of the input to the outcomes are going to be governed by the state of the international political situation. The three situations that he is concerned with are balance of power, loose bipolar, and tight bipolar systems. For the rules for each of these situations he used Morton Kaplan's rules governing international relations. He took Kaplan's rules and simplified and programmed them. The interest that the acting nations have for the target nations is indicated by different interest levels, which include trade, coalition membership, presence or absence of military bases of the actor in the target area, and geographic proximity.

The mechanics of the actual operation involve the experimenter's entering an "action card" into the computer, which states what a given actor is doing in relation to a particular target area. The machine then computes how each of the other nations will respond to the action, and then it realigns the system, taking into account the original action and the other nations' responses to the action. A simple comparison of the original power positions and the final power positions will reveal what the effect of the action has on the overall system.

It occurs to me that this simulation would have a great deal of value in a system where the rules and regulations are both obvious and permanent. In the international arena, however, I feel that the human factors are much more ambiguous than Benson allows for. For example, I tend to doubt that the computer would assign a .800 intensity level of action (limited war) to the United States, in the event of a .400 level of action (propaganda-subversion campaign) and a .600 level (troop movements) by China, in relation to Vietnam today. In actuality his simulation does not delve into the finer areas of international relations, such as internal conflicts.

A major aspect of the second simulation which I am going to discuss is the role of internal problems and their effect on external situations. The simulation is the one developed by Harold Guetzkow of Northwestern University. (17,18) As opposed to the simulation devised by Benson, this one used no computers. It is entirely a coordinated effort of the people running the simulation. In the simulation there are five "nations". Each of these units is manned by two decision-makers. There is an internal decision-maker (IIM) and an external decision-maker (EIM). The former makes the decisions of the overall policy, both internal and external, while the latter conducts the relations of his unit with the other units. One of the problems that is often encountered in studying international relations, is the problem of the negligible amount of information that is available on the relationship of the external and internal processes. This feature of Guetzkow's simulation is extremely important in that it allows for the observation of the two systems interacting.

Aside from the IIM and the EIM there is a feature of the simulation which relates the actions of the decision-makers to their continuation in the game. "The probability of being maintained in office depended upon calculations made by the researchers as to how well external and internal goals were being achieved by the nation in question." (19) Included in the goals of the nations were such items as security, domination, cooperation, and internal growth. A further attempt at making the simulation more life-like was that "Each nation periodically received basic resources which it could allocate to its internal functioning or utilize in external affairs, either as aid or as strategic strength." (20)

In actuality, Benson's computer could have been replaced by Guetzkow's team of researchers. The significant difference in their simulations, however, is that Benson

(17) Guetzkow, op. cit., Simulation in Social Science, p. 82.

(18) See also Grausark #5 (19 July 1953), p. 2. (JB)

(19) Guetzkow, op. cit., Simulation in Social Science, p. 85.

formed an international system, and then proceeded to subject the system to externally injected variable changes. In Guetzkow's simulation the changes in the overall outlook of the system were internally conceived. Once all of the participants understood their potentialities, and what they could do with their resources, the simulation was begun.

The units had the rights of real nations, in that they could make alliances, deploy their resources for internal or external expansion, put resources in reserve, or take any military action, up to and including war. All communication in the system was written (for recording purposes), and propaganda and the new relative positions of the units were published in a "world newspaper". (21)

In addition to a set of rules, the outcomes of the different moves were determined by subjective judgments of the researchers. The primary judgments made involved the question of how well the decision-makers were fulfilling their nations' goals.

The value of simulations such as this was stated by Guetzkow: "It is believed that inter-nation simulations will be of heuristic value in clarifying our theories of international relations...its operating character demands a greater clarity in formulation than is often necessitated in literary and mathematical formulations." (22)

The third simulation that I will discuss is of a different nature from the previous two. Morton Kaplan's simulation is designed specifically to study the balance of power theories. (23) Kaplan makes certain assumptions about the nature of a balance of power, and proceeds from there to observe the actions that take place on his "board". Although somewhat simpler in form than the prior two simulations discussed, Kaplan's simulation consists of basically the same organization. In that he was more political science oriented than behavior oriented, he concluded his simulation with observations about the system par se, as opposed to the individuals acting and reacting within it. Samples of his observations are the following:

"There is some tendency in the system for alliances to form and for alliances to culminate in at least limited war." (24)

"The stability of any balance of power...are acutely sensitive to the form and intensity of the military exchange rate, and to the power of the weapons to destroy economic resources." (25)

The popularity of simulation has spread beyond the scope of active political scientists. In 1954 Allan B. Calhaver created the game Diplomacy. By 1959 the game was perfected to its present state and Calhaver marketed it. In 1960 Games Research, Inc. took the game over from Calhaver and is producing it today. Since that time, John Boardman formed a magazine, Graustark, whose main purpose is to print the moves, which are mailed to him, of the different games that he is conducting. Today the game has reached the point of popularity, where there are a great many magazines, each having participants all over the country and in Canada.

"In Diplomacy each player guides the destiny of one European power through the intricacies of international politics. By negotiating alliances with other players, and careful planning, each player seeks to control Europe. Diplomacy tests not only your ability to plan a campaign, but to outwit your fellow players in diplomatic relations." (26)

As can be seen from the general description of the game, it assumes the inevitability of war. The previous simulations were created for scientific purposes, while even Calhaver appreciates the fact that Diplomacy is purely for fun. A familiarity with Diplomacy, however, will lead to an appreciation of the tactics of military conquest, and to a lesser degree, the value and significance of diplomatic relations.

(21) ibid., p. 87.

(22) ibid., p. 88.

(23) Kellman, op.cit., p. 240.

(24) ibid., p. 243.

(25) ibid., p. 243.

(26) Games Research, Inc., Rules for Diplomacy, title page (1961).

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1967U (continued from p. 1)

Russia and Turkey may each build one. England must remove one unit. The deadline for these "Winter 1904" moves is NOON, SATURDAY 21 OCTOBER 1967.

France, having lost all its supply centers, is out of the game. The French units are removed.

John Beshara, playing Turkey, will be away from 27 October to 5 December. In his absence, Turkey will be played by Tom Griffin, whose address appears on p. 4. Griffin has full plenipotentiary powers to negotiate for Turkish interests.

THE MINISTRY OF MISCELLANY

Owing to the space required by Steve Gordon's article, several features will be postponed to subsequent issues, including most press releases, all the letters, and the O-O-Hate and Beaucauillon serials.

*

GRAUSTARK subscriptions are 10 issues for \$1.00. Back issues for the last year and more are available at 10¢ each.

*


Charles Brannan, publisher of Wild 'n' Woolly, and his wife Christine, who publishes Kalmar, have moved to 411 Fairmount Ave., Oakland, Calif. 94611.

*

Sherry Heap (see p. 4 for her address) announces the formation of an amateur literary group, the Armchair Critics' Guild, for the purpose of discussing great literature and authors, reviewing books, and for criticism. A mimeographed magazine, The Armchair Critic, edited by Mrs. Heap, will provide the place for members to exchange views and ideas with one another. Interested persons should get in touch with her.

GRAUSTARK #141

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"Never was patriot yet, but was
a fool." - John Dryden (1631-1700)