

Welcome to the final issue of Passchendaele, published this 2nd day of April in the one thousand nine hundred and ninety-fourth year of our Lord, by François Cuerrier from 412 Oshawa Blvd. North, Oshawa, Ont. L1G 5T3.

PARTING PEARLS OF WISDOM:

Third Law of Advice: Simple Advice is Good Advice.

Some people are sure they could move mountains if only somebody would just clear the foothills out of the way.

A candle loses nothing by lighting another candle.

Weiter's Law: nothing is impossible for the man who does not have to do it himself.

Mother's Day: nine months after Father's Day.

Think twice before you speak, and you may say something even more aggravating.

Do not believe in miracles - rely on them.

Mayo's First Observation: the person who creates it is forgotten; the person who fixes it is immortalized.

It is a poor workman indeed who blames his own tools.

Evans' Law: no matter what goes wrong, there is always somebody who knew it would.

Olivier's Law: experience is something you don't get until just after you needed it.

Matz's Maxim: a conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking.

A committee is a group that keeps minutes and wastes hours.

When working towards the solution of a problem, it always helps if you know the answer.

No experiment is ever a complete failure: it can always serve as a bad example.

If some people lived up to their ideals, they would be stooping.

Words must be weighed, not counted.

He was so narrow-minded that he could see through a keyhole with both eyes.

Never say you know a man until you have divided an inheritance with him.

Law of Unintended Consequences: when you are up to your neck in alligators, it is hard to remember that your goal was to drain the swamp.

Stewart's Law of Retroaction: it is easier to get forgiveness than permission.

You cannot propel yourself forward by patting yourself on the back.

Barking dogs never bite... while barking.

Experience: the name that men give to their mistakes.

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QUO VADIS?!
A LOOK AT TURKEY IN 1901

Turkey has been blessed with the best defensive position of the entire board. It has only five provinces to defend, instead of the usual six or seven. Every front is narrow and inaccessible: Austria is usually stopped dead in its tracks before Constantinople; a prepared Turkey has the upper hand over the strategic Bla area; and even Italy will have trouble achieving clear naval superiority over Aeg/Eas.

Conversely, Turkish expansion can itself be painfully slow. Without foreign assistance, there will be little hope of enforcing claims over Ser, Gre, Rum, or Sev. Furthermore, it is often difficult to retain any gain against a determined alliance, with the result that many Turkeys stall at 4 or 5 centers. At least Bulgaria is not easily denied, and of all the countries a careful Turkey is least likely to be denied a build, let alone compelled to make a removal, in 1901.

Turkey begins with the diplomatic initiative, pure and simple. Russia and Italy must make difficult commitments one way or another very early on, but you can easily adopt a non-committal approach. Whereas Austria may get quite frantic in her desperate search for an ally, Turkey can almost afford to be complacent. This is probably why Austria will support Turkey into Rumania more often than vice-versa, followed up by Austrian attacks to cut support from the Ukraine as you overwhelm Sevastopol with units in Rumania, Black Sea, and Armenia. But this "normal" development is more easily described than accomplished:

§ Austria: at once an excellent target and ally. If Italy is willing to concede Greece, then it may be profitable to join the RI alliance in picking at the remnants of the Hapsburg empire. But the geography of the Balkans is such that the stiffest resistance will likely be against your own advance; to get anywhere, you may have to rely on support from an ally, and usually these are provided only reluctantly since you have so little of substance to offer in return.

A careful evaluation of the RI alliance must be made before taking sides. Italy's 1901 performance will be of paramount importance, for if entrenched in Vie/Tri there can be little doubt that it will be spoiling for a fight over Ser/Gre. Similarly, a Russia that quickly secures Vie/Bud/Rum may well decide to turn the knife against you while you're still struggling over your own share of the spoils. And of course, the main long-term worry is whether RI will continue the alliance against their second immediate target - you.

Accordingly you may wish to revise your own priorities, especially if Austria manages to climb beyond four centers. You both have a fearsome enemy in Russia, and Rum/Sev are more easily conquered than Gre/Ser. Austria makes your most eager ally, and any gain against Russia is more easily held because Bla becomes an uncuttable source of support once the white fleet has been eliminated.

By the time you've reached six centers, Austria may have barely entered Warsaw. You still hold the diplomatic initiative, with a choice between Austria and Italy for an ally. Austria will find it difficult to proceed against you for as long as a fleet remains in the Black Sea, able to provide uncuttable support along the littoral, and Bul/Con will remain inaccessible without naval assistance (in short supply with the best of Austrians). This edge will increase if the two of you proceed against Italy, enabling you to entrench forces along yet another easily defended flank.

§ Russia: This position has traditionally been considered to make an excellent ally. The two countries complement each other well - Russia providing the cutting edge of the land offensive, and Turkey supplying most of the naval muscle. Indeed, by uniting RT remove their most serious common obstacle, that of getting through the usual stalemates in Germany, Italy and the Mediterranean before the rest of the players have had time to organize. Very seldom will they get in one another's way, for Russia's attention is likely to shift north when Turkey tackles Italy once Austria has been down for the count.

Although the Bla/Arm border can be very sensitive, some arrangement can usually be worked out (e.g. stand-offs). Where insufficient safeguards are built in, you will likely benefit: a Russian fleet build may be a clear signal, but the Russian player will routinely expect fleet builds in Con. He might insist on Smyrna builds, but you can credibly decline by pointing out that Ank requires some kind of protection against his stabs.

But the RT alliance is not necessarily the best agreement unless your only aim is a two-way draw. Even this will to a large extent depend on Russian good-will: his own growth is likely to outpace yours by a wide margin, and he may eventually decide in favour of either a stab or a secret race for the 18th center. Of course, you can hardly expect him to ignore Italian offers, either...

Conversely Russia makes perhaps your best target. It is possible to grow beyond even the "easy" Rum/Sev, taking Mos/War and removing an opponent essentially on your own terms. And the Bla question is annoying, damnit.

§ Italy: certainly your chief rival in the Mediterranean, you will end up fighting this neighbour as well as the Austrians for control of Gre/Ser, particularly if Italian attacks against Tri/Vie were very successful in 1901. Outside the Balkans and the Bla littoral, Italy is your only natural expansion route and without an ally it will be difficult to defeat as it holds the key doorways of Tri and Ion.

Your correspondence is likely to be based on mistrust, as you both know that before too long there will be competition over the same centers and for naval domination of the same areas. Obviously an Italian Lepanto is highly undesirable and you should go to great pains in pointing out the disadvantages: slow deployment, unfavourable partition of the spoils, northern/western provinces left poorly defended for the entire length of the campaign.

Given Italian reluctance to go after France, then as a last resort your diplomacy should encourage war against Austria: better her than you! Your negotiations should go in that direction even if Austria is your ally, for Italy can hardly be expected to remain idle.

In any campaign against Austria, the most sensitive question will always be the partition of the spoils themselves. You should probably support Italian claims over Vie as a sign of good faith, but also because Vie/Bud is a strong defensive line that you do not want Russia to obtain, and Italian possession of Vie a frequent source of RT friction later on. A grateful Italy may agree to make the split even by letting you into Gre/Ser, though it won't be surprising if she reneges once she's secured her share.

Usually the greatest Italian threat will come after the downfall of Austria, depending on just how well France has been doing. If your growls in the direction of Russia are convincing enough, there's a slim chance that your Mediterranean rival will (wrongly) trust you and send the crucial fleets towards Gibraltar.

§ England: in the early stages this country will always play a crucial part in your plans. ALWAYS encourage an attack in Scandinavia: the loss of Swe/StP will keep this ally at a modest growth level, or even turn a formidable enemy into an easy target. In order to be more persuasive, you should point out that England normally takes the north in 1902-04 or never does at all, and that a minor campaign in this area can serve as a ready excuse for useful non-involvement in a FG war. Your aim here is not only to sound persuasive, but also to promote the ideal conditions for a lengthy western deadlock.

Even beyond this point England can remain useful. It is not at all uncommon for Turkey to simply overwhelm the Austrian position and approach the gates of Munich after the downfall of Russia. Obviously England might be interested in a partition of her next enemy, Germany, especially since your terms would per force sound so attractive: she gets Den/Kie/Hol/Bel while you'll be content with Mun/Ber.

Of course any Turkey that gets this far becomes very difficult to hold, let alone push back; the worthwhile English players will realize this, politely decline the offer,

and annoyingly increase their presence in the Mediterranean instead.

§ France: possibly your ultimate obstacle to victory, yet in the early stages France can be so useful by its mere presence: the very existence of F Spa(sc) and the allied threat of a F Mar build is often enough to keep the most aggressive of Italian players on their toes.

For this reason you do not want an early EF war, if only to keep the English threat on Russia and the French menace on Italy alive as long as possible. With no actual leverage in the area whatsoever, this may be accomplished by adopting the negotiating tone of the truly disinterested friend, of the party providing free advice with "nothing in it" for himself. It will be necessary to emphasize the benefits of an EF alliance against Germany, and that by the mid-game it becomes easier for France to stab England than vice-versa anyhow. You might also want to argue that a good way to surreptitiously bring the French navy to par with the English is by building F Mar. The Italians will not be able to do much about it, or at least won't do anything that they didn't plan to in the first place.

The idea of course is to provoke franco-italian friction without being too obvious about it. The worst thing that could happen is France moving its fleet to the Channel in 1901 instead of Spa(sc). By then you should be worrying why France and Italy seem to be getting along so well; but if the move was prompted more by hostility towards England than friendship for Italy, then perhaps there's still a chance to direct Italian attention westbound.

France will as a rule be difficult to manipulate, and once the East has been stabilized you should not wish her well. French involvement as you're attacking Italy is always bad news, as it will mean competition for centers and position under the best of circumstances. To get anywhere against a strong French presence, it will become necessary to woo another western power.

§ Germany: useful at first, this western power can also eventually deny you victory.

Regardless of your own relationship with Russia, encouragement should be provided for a German bounce over Sweden, essentially for the same reason that you'd want England to take StP later on.

Of course, the better German players will see big advantage in doing this without much persuasion on your part: a strong Russia is bad news, and even at 7 centers she can already handily spare a second unit for action in the north. On top of this, a strong German diplomat often can curry English favour by opposing Russian adventurism in the region.

From that point on, however, Germany will gradually become more of an obstacle. Turkish expansion in either Austria or Russia will not be looked upon kindly, and may even prompt German intervention if the west is somewhat stable. Your diplomacy must aim towards the diplomatic isolation of Germany, for otherwise her armies will come barrelling out of its eastern borders even as she is completing the conquest of her western target, just as her western ally is subtly locking up the Mediterranean.

Keeping the west in turmoil certainly appears to be the main Turkish problem. Even at 17 centers (assuming all of Italy, Tunis, Austria, the Balkans, Turkey, and Sev/Mos/War) Turkey can be so easily held back by just about any united western block. The Mediterranean is easy to deadlock, either around Italy or along the NAf/Wes/Lyo/Mar line, and indeed the dominant western naval power will reach these critical areas before Turkey. By the same token, Germany can also be held indefinitely along Tyo/Boh/Sil/Pru Lvn/StP, or even as far back as Mun/Ber(StP) or Mun/Kie(StP). And just as the battle reaches its crucial climax, Turkey will suddenly find that its builds take seemingly forever to reach the front lines.

It is important to keep the west in turmoil until at least 1906, but failing that Turkey can still win by making gains past one part of the stalemate line (e.g.,

Germany) of such significance that the onus for the western powers will shift from just holding you back to actually retaking territory.

THE LOOSE CANNON
FINAL ARTICLE IN A SERIES ON "RELATIONSHIPS"

It's been a most exciting game. You, as Germany, have accumulated a handsome 10 centers, and your English ally has another 11. You are fighting the evil Turks - the largest power at 13 centers. The going will be slow, but the outcome no longer in doubt: your opponent has no stalemate line to fall back on, and your ally has agreed to a two-way draw. Case closed. On to the next game.

There's only one problem: that Turkey (appropriate name, that!) stubbornly refused to accept any draw that will exclude him, and accordingly vetoes all proposals for a concession to EG.

Wait a minute, what's this? Your eyes have just moved up from the vote results, and you've spotted a couple of strange English moves. F Edi-NTH... F Nth-HEL... F Nwy-SKA... F SWE S F Nwy-SKA? What's going on?

Ah, there's an explanation from the English player in the press... "Sorry, but I prefer solo wins, and you've left yourself so open that I couldn't resist the urge to make a go of it. Maybe next game..." The little twerp!

Most players would at this point seek revenge, quite understandably. Your two-front struggle has become hopeless, sandwiched as you are between England and Turkey. This game-year is sure to reduce you to the rank of small powers, as England is sure to take Paris, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and possibly even Kiel. Since you're going to go down in flames anyhow, you might as well give every center you can to Turkey in an attempt to punish that English miscreant by throwing the game to Turkey.

This reaction is very normal, but rather pathetic as far as strategies go. If you can't have your own shot at a win or draw, you might as well be a kingmaker. But any player who reacts in this fashion is losing sight of the object of the game, which is to win or share in a win. Just because you've made it easier for another player to win doesn't mean that you won't have lost. As disastrous as the situation may be on the battlefield, one shouldn't jump to conclusions before at least taking another look at the diplomatic situation.

The English player may well be in a position to remove you as a major power, but his strategy will be successful only if he takes an 18th center. Until this happens, the game isn't over; and until it is, your chances to share in a draw remain relatively intact.

This will even be true if there are other minor powers as well. The English player did not stab you for the sheer fun of it; the centers of these minor powers were probably already solidly entrenched, under adequate Turkish protection, and thus beyond his reach. No, he's going to win only if he manages to take his 18th center from you. And he's obviously not going after a two-way draw with Turkey, since he was already reasonably assured of one with you.

Your first task will be to deny him that 18th center; and the second, to make yourself indispensable to Turkey. Of the two, the latter may well be the most difficult.

Your first reaction should be to fire off an ultimatum to... both Turkey and England. To England, you will react in the normal fashion, threatening to give the game to Turkey unless he pulls out immediately. And, assuming that your front is still intact, you will still be able to stonewall Turkey even as England gobbles up the coastal centers. You've already correctly judged them to be indefensible anyhow, and it's important to keep Turkey from making any headway to make a point if nothing else.

Such an attitude will probably be very disappointing to the Turkish player. The stab had apparently revived his own chances, and he was probably rubbing his hands in anticipation. He might even react emotionally himself: he didn't stab you, so why are you fighting him while England walks away with the game?

The answer, of course, is that this strategy is your only option. If you're not going to share in a draw, then it matters little to you who wins; it could be England for what you care.

But the situation is very different with Turkey. He's still at 13 centers, and was the largest power on the board right up to the stab. His hope had been that you would react emotionally; giving him the win would have been an appropriate punishment for England. Doubtless he'd be very happy to give you "assistance"; but he'll be very reluctant to treat you as an equal until you've put it squarely to him that his only choice lies between an outright English win and a three way EGT draw. You might even demand Turkish centers rather than "assistance".

This bluff will be very difficult to pull off. The Turkish player will have great difficulty believing that your response to the stab won't be purely emotional after all (though an unopposed string of English builds should sink the message in quickly enough); and even if he does, it will be hard for him to keep his judgement from being affected by his frustration. In any event, it's always so difficult to give up cherished centers to a lesser power, and the request might even make him think that it's only part of a clever EG ploy.

But even if it doesn't work, you still have a limited range of tactical options. Concentrate your strength around the inland centers, where England may well be unable to apply enough strength to capture them for herself. Especially if the centers are near or on a stalemate line (War and Mos are ideal, though Mun and Ber might also do), your negotiating position will be correspondingly strengthened. When a few game-years later the players are faced with a 16-16-2 situation, you may well end up with both England and Turkey friendly; neither daring to withhold support on the odd chance that the other would take them.

In the end, the two major powers may have to recognize you as holding an indispensable portion of the stalemate line, even if they didn't go along with your bluff earlier. Note, however, that they may instead decide to trust one another and combine against you in order to shorten the three-way draw to a two-way draw.

But even this will require an impressive amount of trust, which probably won't be available in the first place (remember, England and Turkey have hardly been game-long allies). At any rate, it will be the only element for you to go on, and if all else fails, you will at least have the satisfaction of fighting a superb game right up to the finish.

[...continued from page one.]

Jones' Motto: friends may come and go, but enemies accumulate.

Some men are discovered; others are found out.

Why is it that every time you start to make ends meet, somebody comes along and moves the ends?

To err is human... and to blame it on another guy is even more human.

Those of you who think you know everything are annoying to those of us who do.

I used to be conceited, but now I'm absolutely perfect.

Law of Probable Dispersal: the shit will not be distributed evenly when it hits the fan.

Ballance's Law of Relativity: how long a minute is depends on which side of the bathroom door you're on.

A halo only has a few centimeters down to go before becoming a noose.

Often statistics are used as a drunken man uses lamp posts: for support, not illumination.

He who falls in love with himself will have no rivals.

THE PAPER TIGER

Of all the Great Powers, Russia is widely regarded as the strongest, and tends to do well on many preference lists. And with good reason: it starts the game with four units, and is the only power to end 1901 at six centers with any regularity. It is the only power that can end the first year with more, as indeed it sometimes does. Russia does very well under most ratings systems, and indeed has often topped the list of wins. Finally, Russia is also commonly regarded as a "corner power" with defensive attributes not normally identified with positions such as Germany, Austria, and Italy.

But whereas Austria and Italy are most commonly regarded as the underdogs, Russia perhaps suffers from the reverse syndrome, that of being vastly overrated. Opponents will occasionally attack her simply out of fear; and with four neighbours, Russia is perhaps the country most open to invasion. Because its units are spread on two fronts and often cannot coordinate, Russia is perhaps the trickiest country to defend as well.

Russian expansion will also be very difficult to secure. Early in the game the player will be confronted with an odd paradox: in the process of carrying out precautionary measures, it becomes a threat to some other player. The player might want Galicia in Spring 1901 for more leverage on Rumania, but only at the cost of strained relations with Austria; the Black Sea cannot be allowed to fall to the opposition, yet Turkey might object to any move in this direction, even as part of a bounce; a build in Saint-Petersburg is very appropriate for protection against an English unit in Norway, but will normally be viewed suspiciously - if not provocatively - by the English player.

This might very well force Russia into giving up ground in one region in order to advance in another: Turkey may have to be allowed into the Black Sea in order to secure an alliance against Austria; Germany may consider joint action against England, but not if Russia proceeds to build StP(sc) in view of shoring up the Swedish defenses. No other power is normally expected to give up position to secure an alliance: a partition of the opponent will normally be sufficient.

The geography of the board is unfavourable to Russia wherever she might look. Expansion must be channelled through some difficult bottlenecks, bottlenecks that do not work well in the reverse situation, that of repelling invasions. To wit:

§ the Black Sea: a sore point with Turkey as it borders on two Turkish home centers, one Russian home center, Rumania and Bulgaria. The Russian fleet is caged in - it can only take Rumania or stay in Sevastopol to placate Turkish suspicion, but in both cases an army would be much more sensible (for the purpose of exerting influence inland).

The balance of power is clearly in favour of Turkey. Even if the opponents bounce through 1901 (not always advisable in the Fall if Sevastopol is also threatened from Armenia), Turkey can always build F Con in the Winter. Russia won't be able to do that as Sevastopol is still occupied by the first fleet, and at any rate will seldom be able to spare the resources for a second one so early. Turkey can henceforth take the contested space at will with F Con S F Ank-Bla, and thereafter won't even need the extra fleet to maintain its edge.

Even in the event of all-out war, progress will be very difficult as the fleet must leave Sevastopol before an army can take its place and threaten the one weak Turkish point: Armenia. Thereafter, the question of what to do with the fleet will continue to arise, as it will be very difficult to move onwards towards the Mediterranean. Constantinople must first be taken, and even then following up into the Aegean Sea will be very difficult until a second fleet has been placed in either Bul(sc) or Smyrna. For this reason, most Russians will simply concede the Mediterranean as they don't normally manage to enter it before 1904 or so.

By contrast, Turkey can easily bring a lot of units to bear simply by occupying both the Black Sea and Armenia. Of the two moves, only the former can be contested in Spring 1901, and will probably not be again in the Fall. With Austrian help, both Rumania and Sevastopol will eventually fall. It's only a question of time.

§ the Galicia corridor: this province is so pivotal to Russia's southern strategy that few players will resist the temptation of moving there right away. Without three units to bear on Rumania, it will be too easy for Austria and Turkey to team up in denying Russia that critical center. And without a unit in Galicia to threaten Austrian home centers, Austria might well feel that there is no danger in rebuking Russia in the Balkans.

But even with control of Galicia, it will be difficult to take an Austrian home center in 1901. It will be impossible without Italian assistance, for that matter, if Austria has A Vie and A Ser at the end of the Spring, as A Vie-Bud and A Ser-Bud will lock up the entire front rather nicely.

And the situation will only get worse if Russia attempts to "go it alone" after 1901. Without allies it will become excruciatingly difficult to gain a single inch of Austrian territory once the builds have taken place, and indeed control of Galicia itself may eventually be in jeopardy.

§ the Barren line: most German and Russian players will be eager for a demilitarization of Bal/Pru/Sil/Lvn/War in the early stages of the game, as both fully expect to be kept busy on other fronts.

However, a big obstacle to peace will be Sweden. Germany may well be tempted into bouncing Russia out of the center, and in the subsequent escalation both sides will come to regard the previously "demilitarized" zone as unsafe. Furthermore, the western front will rarely require the commitment of all five or six German units (A Mun, A Ruh, A Hol, F Den will do, sometimes less), meaning that the extra units can be sent east. Russia, by contrast, will normally need all of its units elsewhere (St-Petersburg and the south), meaning that the balance of power will normally favour Germany.

Arguably, Russian survival hinges heavily on isolating Germany. An EG alliance will wreak havoc, as the two powers can work closely and overrun Scandinavia, if not even Warsaw and Moscow. In a sense, an FG alliance is even worse, as it might well release the German player of his obligation to keep his armies west. This means that both Warsaw and Livonia could well come under heavy fire as early as 1902, with Scandinavia also exposed to full-scale invasion as soon as the English threat has been dealt with.

The German border is perhaps the easiest route into the Russian heartland. Austria is normally incapable of progress beyond Galicia; Turkey can often lay claim to no more than Rumania and Sevastopol; and the English threat does not extend much beyond Saint-Petersburg, except when the center falls to an army. But once Germany captures either of Livonia or Warsaw, his concern shifts to the competition that he might face for the rest of the Russian centers rather than the opposition that Russia might conceivably muster.

Livonia and Ukraine are arguably the most critical provinces for Russia, as both border on three home centers. But unlike Ukraine, Livonia is very vulnerable, especially with the Baltic Sea under German control. It is not atypical for Germany to subtly open up to the Baltic Sea while leaving both Prussia and Silesia open, worrying the Russian to no end over Sweden, only to sneak an army into Livonia via the convoy route even as other units occupy both of the two German eastern provinces.

§ Scandinavia: perhaps the most difficult region for Russia to handle. Russia is perhaps the only power that must beg for its second build, as its capture of Sweden in 1901 depends exclusively upon German good will. And after 1901, Russia can only consolidate its gains at the risk of offending a powerful neighbour. Only one unit can be built in St-Petersburg, meaning that only one of Sweden or St-Petersburg can be adequately defended. F StP(sc) can be built and moved to Botnia in the Spring, followed up by A Mos-StP, but these moves will likely arouse suspicion from both Germany and England, while leaving the south so weak as to tempt Austria and Turkey into aggression as well. The same 3-4 units that will permit only a minimal defense in the north could be used to reap far greater rewards down south; and even in the offense, only Norway will normally be available. Many Russian players fall into this trap, getting involved in a full-scale northern adventure only to discover that neither France nor Germany are interested in allowing the capture of Edinburgh, even if they don't continue their alliance once England has been dealt with, against Russia this time. Russian strategy is also handicapped

because fleets operating along one coast of Scandinavia cannot easily coordinate with those on the other coast, builds cannot be directed to both coasts at once in any year, and those on the south coast (including all "at start" forces) are bottled in by Swe/Den.

The only alternative to some strength in the north is no strength at all. Beware of the consequences, however, as few English and German players will normally resist the urge of taking both Sweden and St-Petersburg, especially when either or both can be had simply for the asking.

Quite a dilemma!

Fortunately the Russian situation will start improving after 1902 as it obtains yet more builds. Perhaps the greatest Russian weakness of them all lies in the fact that, even at six centers, it must devote most of its strength (4-5 units) in an attempt to keep the south well under control. This leaves the northern flank weak for the first two game-years; but afterwards, any builds can be used there, once the south has reached saturation. It's not uncommon for successful Russian strategists to hit Austria hard - while they still can - in the first game-years, moving up to 7 or 8 centers in the process. Only then can they comfortably turn their attention northward, and if they've been fortunate enough to promote an EF alliance against Germany, they can usually start moving west in an effort to pick up the pieces.

It's been said of Germany and Austria that they will find it comparatively easy to grow once they've ensured survival for themselves in the early going. The reverse situation seems to apply to Russia: the only way to survive is by ensuring early growth.

VOX POPULI IN PERSPECTIVE:

Most of the following letters are very old, some probably dating to 1989, but yet the material in them appears to have kept remarkably well. A lot of them were written in response to my fold announcement of mid-1990; unsurprisingly, without exception they expressed a sense of loss and were generally sympathetic to the publisher. (Back then, I would have said that negative remarks could only be expected to appear in other publications, but, amazingly, these were scarce.) The content of the other letters is in most cases self-explanatory, though the following brief introductions appear to be in order:

- ¶ the letters of Per Westling and David Hood were in response to material published in previous issues regarding ratings systems, The Bad Boys, the electronic mail hobby and the insularity of British publishers (and their reluctance to get involved internationally).
- ¶ Iain Bowen wrote in about a reprint from the Toronto Sun, which had been especially harsh in its complaints over the cost of official bilingualism in Canada.
- ¶ Mark Nelson's shots at Cal White were just pure banter of the sort which was not exactly uncommon in either Passchendaele or Northern Flame even if Cal in the end took it seriously and flew into something of a tizzy.
- ¶ Mark Lew's reference to Michael Lowrey was prompted by my expression of surprise in a previous issue at receiving a letter from him commenting on features of the 'zine at length even though he was not a subscriber.

VOX POPULI

From John Cain (Australia): [...]

No condolences, just sincere thanks for the many issues of Passchendaele that I have received and greatly enjoyed. It will be missed.

I will of course take care of Australian subscription refunds (I have transferred the accounts to Victoriana, with the option of a refund for those who want it). [...]

Since you had been requesting 10s, you may be interested to know that I had already voted you a "10" prior to hearing news of your fold.

From Melinda Ann Holley (U.S.): Sonny to hear about the fold. I hope it's due to hobby burn out rather than health reasons. (I told you ulcers were nasty.) [...]

From John Dods (New Zealand): I owe you heaps of issues, so this trade will go for some time yet. Hope things are well, François.

I'd just finished a long letter (took two months to write) for your letter column - you bugger.

From Ron Cameron (U.S.): [...]

You aren't fooling me. I don't believe you'll fold. If you do, you'll be back soon.

From Dominique LeBris (France): It was really unfortunate that Passchendaele should fold at this time. I had placed so much hope in an international forum. A letter will follow soon.

From Andrew Lischett (U.S.): Tear up this cheque. If you send it to me again, I'll tear it up and your cheque book will never again balance.

If you used the word "commiserations" in issue #104 to mean that you will never moan and groan and pity yourself in Passchendaele, I believe you used the word incorrectly. Although I suppose one can commiserate with oneself, unless expressed that way specifically, "commiserate" implies feeling or expressing pity on sadness for another person.

If you knew this and meant either that you will not express pity on sorrow toward someone else or that you will not print subscribers' expressions of pity on sorrow toward you or each other, then never mind.

[...]

From Jacques Bélanger (Canada): [...]

Even if the Meech Lake Agreement passes, it will be only the first step in a long process. The francophone community still has to get some respect from the Nunziatas of this world.

Just received your fold announcement. What can I say? It sure came as a shock. Thanks for the refund: after all you had written on that subject, I was not really expecting it and I had come to accept the fact that Passchendaele would fold without a refund.

So you won't be around to discuss Quebec's secession. It sure would have been fun!

From Andrew Lischett (U.S.): I liked your article in Passchendaele#111 on Germany, and it - especially the fourth paragraph - reminded me of "My Favourite Diplomacy Opening" inside this two year old issue. This opening may look rash, but it does stabilize the West (as you advise) because everyone who can will go after Russia, and France won't bother Germany without an ally. France and Italy could hint Germany, but they're unlikely to realize it in time. I've tried this four times (once postally, three times FTF) and got two wins, one three- on four-way draw, and in the other I was flattened fast by EFR.

[Andy's favourite opening as Germany is: A Mun-Sil, A Ber-Pru, F Kie-Den.]

From Per Westling (Sweden): Sonny to hear that you are folding. I hope that you will return as a publisher but I understand that the "real world" takes precedence. If you were to continue publishing I would have accepted a mutual subscription in lieu of an all-for-all trade. More so as your 'zine accelerated in its rate of publishing while mine went from a monthly to a five-weekly. If you come back I might be interested in re-establishing our trade, but don't know if I'll be around then, as the end of this year seems uncertain.

I will send you my 'zine until at least #12 as I feel that I gained so much by our trade. You're welcome to participate in the letter column but I don't have an explicit "deadwood" policy as you had, nor even an implicit one (except in the case of some trades).

Regarding reprints: am I allowed to reprint articles you have written about Diplomacy and history about the period before, during and directly after the Great War? If you don't get the 'zine at that time that I reprint any of your articles, I will of course send you that issue as a freebie (normal practice).

I have promised you a letter of comment and the rest of this letter should be one commenting on some issues of Passchendaele. Some of the things I might have commented on have already been commented sufficiently by other readers. Er, after skimming through the bundle of 'zines, I will remember in the future (regarding other 'zines) to be quicker. Otherwise it just becomes too much to make any comments. Anyway, as I said before, I enjoyed your 'zine, and think that it was a good read.

[...]

Re-Turbo Freaks: what is important, really? Well, relations to other human beings - nothing else. Not one's work; not one's career. After one's family and relatives, it is one's friends that are important, and if you pursue making friends through a hobby, who is to say that this is wrong? I wouldn't conclude that a person lives an unsuccessful life just because he is deeply involved in a hobby, whether it's sports or fandom.

Re-the wave of the future: until a standard for pictures develops within the Computer Network Community, I don't think the electronic hobby will completely replace the postal one. (In Scandinavia, a letter still takes from one to two days to reach the recipient, and as the cost of phone calls is low, there wouldn't be any problem with an established postal hobby...) But maybe if faxes were more common, and 'zines sent by this technique, the postal hobby wouldn't be totally "out".

One thing I dislike about electronic mail games is that they are so quick! By this I mean that they require that you use up some time every day answering letters, etc. as the deadlines are only one week apart or less. When playing by regular mail I can proceed at a leisurely pace. Even if they sometimes seem slow, the play-by-mail games don't interfere with my regular life.

Re-John Cain's letter in Vox Populi (issue #98): I have felt the same regarding the insularity of the British hobby. There seems to be less interest in that hobby for international contacts than in America. But the drive by some people to create a unified European hobby (including Britain) might change this.

[The Bad Boys were probably reckless in their sweeping characterization of virtually the entire hobby as just a bunch of "turbo freaks", as so many of my own contacts were with individuals that were well established by any standard, whether as scientists, lawyers, medical students, professional editors or military officers. It's just that as many, a large majority even, of us were not. This was only to be expected of a hobby that can demand so much more than merely the spare time of the average "gainfully employed." This second group of people could be divided into two categories: the college crowd and the bums.]

From David Hood (U.S.): First, a couple of comments on Passchendaele #106. I know you like to take counter-intuitive positions, so you can appear unique (and I think it is working), but your defense of the substance of the Bad Boys' attacks seems a little too far out for me. I admit that I often find their stuff terribly

funny, and that some of their targets were awfully thin-skinned, but when they saw people actually getting hurt they should have laid off. Inneverence and parody are fine, but there are limits to everything.

You applaud the substance of their arguments but rue the manner in which they made their point. I rue some of the substance (picking on people when they are down) while applauding the humour used. Oh well.

There is one drawback to play-by-electronic-mail that Eric should have mentioned. For people who don't have a lot of time, electronic mail games can be too quick. Also, having postal 'zines allows more stylistic/literary embellishment than doing a 'zine on the computer. Hard copy is just easier to read and can be read anywhere, not just at a terminal. However, electronic mail does fulfill a big niche (quicker games) and cuts costs for some people, so I think it is a welcome addition to the hobby. And I certainly plan to include electronic mail games in my ratings system.

Ratings system? Yes. With Pete Fuchs' help I have found the old Dragonstooth system and ratings through Fall 1987. I will add in games since then and have a ratings flyer ready to send out by late May. Ratings will be a quarterly feature in my version of Diplomacy World, to begin in August.

[...]

Don't put so much weight on the victory conditions of the Rulebook. The whole point of designing a scoring system is to value endings other than wins and draws in my opinion. Fact is, centers are a legitimate goal once winning or drawing becomes impossible. Not only does it increase survival chances, but it also reflects the real world pressure for a government to get as much new territory as possible in a war, particularly World War I.

[...]

[Would you be surprised if that was not, in fact, true? The pressure for a government in a war, particularly World War I, is not to get as much territory as possible, but rather to disable opponents as quickly as possible. Land can always be obtained later, at peace talks, and in fact land occupied too early in the war becomes a net burden, creating a requirement for occupation troops that could be much better used on the frontlines. The country which, in World War I, conquered the most territory, Germany, finished the war nearly dead last, just as the power which occupied no enemy possessions at all, the United States, emerged as the clearest victor.

[I can't imagine why any rating system would be particularly concerned about measuring anything other than wins or draws. Does anyone ever care about "finishing second" in any other game? In Monopoly, for instance, winners actually seem to derive their greatest satisfaction as they overcome their final (=strong second) opponent. Indeed, that "strong second" player is going to lose more properties and more cash than any other player on the board.

[In any event, winning or drawing becomes impossible at only one point in the game - when your last center is occupied by an opponent on a Fall turn. The only objective of even a one center power, even with an opponent at 17, continues to be ultimate victory, and a share of it as second best option, albeit on a longer time frame.]

From Iain Bowen (Britain): [...]

Good lead editorial, I tend to think (from my outsider's point of view) that the Bad Boys were a spark that revitalized the North American hobby. They are/were connect; many of us are turbo freaks who devote too much time to the hobby and not enough to the real world. Whilst they were merciless, they were in part connect.

Your look at Russia was quite interesting; whilst mentioning northern openings it didn't really follow through on them. The F/R alliance is useful at the start of the game, especially if a tripartite alliance with Germany is needed. Persuading France to open to the English Channel in league with Germany with their goal being the destruction of England has two positive effects on Russia; firstly a chance to get a good grip on Scandinavia, and secondly a crack at the all important

German centers.

[...]

Your Flashback recalling Operation Punishment and the internal politics of pre-war Yugoslavia was very interesting. The tension in the area is remarkably similar today with all the pre-war territorial grudges being found again. Both the Slovenian and Croatian separatists did well in their recent elections and many Serbs follow a "Greater Serbia" ideal. Of course, Germany isn't there to stir the Balkan pot any more - on is it? Will the all-powerful Deutschland act in a similar way to Hitler's armed forces of 1939-44?

I turned 25 on the 19th of April - no big deal. I've given up celebrating birthdays as they seem so trivial, but you are right: time does seem to just flash by now.

[...]

The excerpt in #104 from the Toronto Sun was quite interesting - the parallels between Quebec and Lithuania could easily be drawn; or even with, say, Scotland. I personally agree with your point about the financial responsibilities; a newly independent state should take on some of the debt burden from its parent/captor but it should be fairly allotted so that the new nation can cope: not as "war reparations".

\$2. billion worth of bilingual programmes, *tsk, tsk*. Don't these people realize what an advantage bilingualism is? Bilingual staff in the United Kingdom are at a premium and fluency in English and French, combined with a normal set of skills, can add substantially to your pay. My employers, Nestlé, run lunchtime courses for volunteer staff in French and German for easy transfer between Yonk, Dijon, Vevey and Munich. What it costs them to hold these courses they reap back many times over.

Of course, an independent Quebec would leave the Maritime provinces out on a limb, but I'm sure Quebec could make arrangements. Protectorate status, maybe?

I currently rent property, a shared house with others, because it is cheaper (£150. a month). But in analysis, I'm not buying because of the freedom aspect. I'm in a mobile career where changing jobs every year to 18 months is normal and changing every six to nine months is not regarded unfavourably. But to do this and take advantage of job offers, you need to be flexible. Owning a house in the United Kingdom with its very stagnant property market would be a hindrance. When I reach a managerial position (well, if) then I expect I'll buy a place. Anyway, at the moment I just can't afford it.

In general, I agree with your comment on the state of the Wehrmacht in late 1918. However, I suspect that unless France or Italy had caved in, the war would have been over by 1920. Turkey had been badly mauled and would have been militarily knocked out by early 1919. Austria-Hungary would have lasted long then and I suspect that the unfair settlements would have been even worse. Possibly the influenza epidemic would have ground both sides to a halt, I don't know; but it belongs to the realm of the "what iftery" and isn't the realm of history. It can be fun, though.

[...]

[Oh, come: how could the unfair settlements have been any worse? Austria-Hungary disappeared from the map, as did the Turkish Empire, and indeed as would Turkey itself if the Allies had had their way. I can't imagine how much worse the terms could have been for Germany, as they included effective demilitarization and loss of control over a large chunk of territory, short perhaps of complete dismemberment or partition.]

From Eric Klien (U.S.): I was quite surprised to see myself use a double negative on p. 12 of your zine, "It is not unethical." I scanned my cybernetic memory and found that you had incorrectly transcribed my letter. The original wording was, "It is unethical".

After speaking to Avalon Hill's computer, I have learned that you were wrong about the sales of Diplomacy declining. In 1987 they were ranked 13th of all Avalon games in sales; in 1988 they were ranked sixth.

[...]

[Shouldn't put words in my mouth this way, Eric. The closest I've ever come is refer to statements by Conrad von Metzke.]

From Mark Nelson (Britain): Now that my exams are over (they finished yesterday) I had planned on writing a long and extensive letter of comment on #105 and #106. In particular your list of 100 questions raised many interesting questions. But there seems little point now that you have decided to fold. I hope that this is only a temporary arrangement and that at some time in the future you will return to publishing. I look forward to that day.

In the meantime, if you should even get the urge to write an article, I'd be delighted to run it.

I hope that you remain in dipdom, and if I manage to reach CarCon in 1991 as planned I look forward to meeting you and having long and complex discussions on many topics. Naturally Cal White will be excluded from such a talk, because as a non-graduate he won't be able to input anything useful... although a role could be reserved for him as chief drink waiter.

[...]

From Mark Lew (U.S.): I'm sorry you're folding, but I won't go on and on about it. If you ever think of changing your mind and starting up again, you can be sure I'm in favour of it. Feel free to refer any of your subscribers to Benzene.

One thing confused me. I got the one-page #107 announcing the fold in the same envelope with #105. #106, on the other hand, had arrived a few days earlier. Isn't that a bit peculiar?

I have a lot of half-written letters responding to recent issues. For lack of anything else to do with them, I've compiled them here, even though you have nowhere to print them now.

I noticed a familiar name in Dominique LeBris' letter. Gérard Chaliard is one of the co-authors of Strategic Atlas, one of my favourite books, and a valuable supplement to my encyclopedias (which are 25 years old) and my almanac (which is short on details).

A note by you in the same letter seems to imply that you believe the C.I.A. is still in the business of political assassination. Is that what you mean to say? Some time in the 1970s, subsequent to the assassination of Salvador Allende in Chile (which I believe we later admitted to), the U.S. Congress rewrote the rules for the C.I.A. forbidding outright assassination. Since then there's been plenty of talk about whether that was a good or bad rule, and about what counts as assassination and what is simply a casualty of war (this topic was hotly debated after we bombed Tripoli), but I assume the C.I.A. has indeed followed the new rules.

As you know, I'm not an apologist for American aggression. I'd be pleased as punch if my country would call the boys home and retreat into our American cocoon leaving the Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans and Middle Easterners and all the others to sort out their differences and caveat viator to American tourists abroad. Nonetheless, I must say that I'm getting bored with your and Brent McKee's loud griping about America's aggressive foreign policy. What do you want us to do? Should we all throw up our hands and say, "OK, OK, you figured it out. We're really just acting in our own selfish interest." Of course we are, silly. Who even doubts it? It's certainly not a big secret plot, as you and Brent seem to think. Yeah, I know the President and Congressmen all talk about making the world safe for democracy on some such not, but when the policy analysts and mid-level bureaucrats talk about it, they go immediately to the national interest. After the Panama invasion, the network news shows gave the usual pap about drug kingpins, but on the serious shows everyone was talking about the real interest, the Canal.

Often even the top government officials are blunt about it. Kissinger, for instance, was always open about our foreign policy motives. Others, starting with Woodrow Wilson, are more prissy and would rather use euphemisms, but it's still the same business. Americans in pursuit of power talk about "promoting democracy"; industry lobbyists in pursuit of government favours talk about "protecting the consumers' interests"; bored houseguests say, "gee, I really must be getting home now." Why do you have to huff and puff about it? Why not just let them have their euphemisms?

I too liked the 1987 Diplom scoring system and agreed with your comments on it. In fact, I even made the same suggestion to David Hood in a letter, except that I suggested .001 for centers instead of .01. In any case, they should only be a tie-breaker. I hope the final system is one which offers points for draws and tie-breaker points for centers, and not a system like the C.A.D. rating system. "Second place" is baloney. But even so, I'm not all worked up about the scoring system. In San Diego, I didn't even pay any attention to it. I just played for my own goals, regardless of how it would be scored. In one game I made good on a threat to suicide against a certain opponent, even though I probably could have held on to two centers and thus would have had that small chance for a comeback some time. My decision was based on several things, but not the scoring system. Of course, it's easy enough for me to disregard the scoring system, since I'm not particularly competitive as a Diplomacy player and I have no expectation of doing well in the tournament anyway...

I happily accept the idea that electronic mail will take over the postal hobby. Some day, when I see an offer which is convenient enough to attract me, I'll get myself hooked up to electronic mail. Then Benzene will have four prices: for the U.S., Canada, overseas, and electronic mail. Like the other prices, the electronic mail price will approximately reflect its cost to me to produce and transmit, so that sending issues by electronic mail will be no more or less a burden on me. The electronic mail price will therefore be considerably lower, and so subscribers will gradually choose that option. At first at least, I wouldn't go out of my way to tailor the 'zine to the electronic mail crowd. They would simply get whatever text files I use for the normal 'zine, and thus they won't get any illustrations, and they'll have to translate the codes for italics, etc., on their own.

[...]

In #106, p. 18, Brent McKee seems to think that your comments dismissing Germany's historical disunity were directed at him. I assumed they were directed at me. Brent has "never seen any argument that Delaware, Rhode Island or Nevada should have fewer senators than Pennsylvania, New York or California simply because the former have far smaller populations." I have. The argument isn't widespread, but it comes up from time to time.

The Diplom rules were interesting. I thought each year was confined to one region, not either of two. So there can be two region I Diploms in a row, huh? Region II's name seems inappropriate to me. How can Kentucky be "Great Lakes" while Toronto and Buffalo are not? A minor point, I know.

Michael Lowrey undoubtedly sees David Hood's copy of Passchendaele. They share 'zines. A few months ago, David asked me to turn the balance of his Benzene subscription over to Michael. Then later when it ran out, it was Michael who renewed.

I think you're stretching things to call Slovenia and Hungary part of the Balkans. Even Croatia and Romania don't really qualify. Balkan is a geographic term, describing a mountain system. Strictly speaking, anything north of the Danube or west of the (Dinaric) Alps is not really Balkan. Croatia and Romania at least border the Balkan region. Hungary and Slovenia don't even do that. Historically as well as geographically, Hungary and Slovenia belong with Austria in Mitteleuropa.

On your mutually assured destruction question, my guess (and hope!) is that a super-power wouldn't under any circumstances choose to destroy the world rather than surrender. That is, I believe the stress will always lead to some agreement

short of holocaust. This agreement may be peaceful partial surrender of one side (as it did in Cuba) or it may mean limited war. I don't see any crisis leading to a decision by any side to destroy the world. Crises do increase the risk of accidental destruction of the world, though.

I liked the blue print in issue #103. I remember way back when (1980?), one of the Canadian 'zines used to have blue print. Was that you?

It'd be nice if you noted the source when you copy newspaper and magazine articles in Passchendaele. (Of course, this is moot now that you've folded.) Reading Mr. Worthington's article (#104, p. 27) discussing how various publications reacted to the prisoner of war story, I found myself wondering which newspaper was printing his column. And in general, whenever I read anything, I like to make a mental note of the source.

Re-our discussion on house buying: you're right, we don't really disagree much. I accepted your general premise, but I thought you were at the same time touting real estate as a financial investment in itself - in the sense that one might buy six or seven houses in addition to his home, intending to sell them later at a higher price - and that's the part I objected to. (As you've seen, I've brought this subject up in Benzene. It's been on my mind lately.)

The financial loss the renter takes consists mostly of the price he pays for the privilege of not being committed financially (and psychologically) to a single location. Thus renting is appropriate for someone who moves a lot, is young, or is otherwise uncertain of his future location. It's also the necessary choice of anyone who can't muster enough capital or credit to buy at a reasonable rate. Renters also pay landlords for the service of handling much of their taxes, utilities, insurance and maintenance - though one can get that sort of service without giving up ownership, through condo arrangements and the like.

It was terribly interesting to see Brent McKee back down on his free speech position. He has illustrated the fundamental dilemma of not just free speech, but of liberalism generally. We all like the concept of respecting everyone else's opinions, but there's always those one or two special things which we really just can't stand, and our commitment to tolerance breaks down. As Brent says, "every liberal has his weak spot". For him it might be racism and sexism; for me it might be something else. A liberal, even a true liberal, is not a moral relativist. Like everyone else, we each have our ideas of right and wrong. If I had the power to impose my morality on the world, I wouldn't hesitate to shed my commitment to free speech and tolerance in favour of making everyone do what I am sure is right. But of course I don't have that power, and no one does, nor will anyone ever come close without a hell of a lot of brutal conflict along the way. So instead, we give up trying to convert others to our way of thinking, and look for a set of political principles which allows the optimum balance of permitting people to pursue their own moralities without causing undue offense to others - even though sometimes that means we have to learn to sit on our hands when others are, in our opinion, wrong. That is what it means to be truly liberal.

In #103 (p. 13) Tim Stabosz offers a definition of terrorism, "They could at least feel sorry for the fact that they felt they had to shoot innocent civilians... but they don't." It should be noted that terrorists themselves claim otherwise. In its April 1989 issue, Playboy ran an interview with Sinn Fein leaders (and MPs from Ulster) Danny Morrison and Gerry Adams, and an I.R.A. provo soldier whose name was withheld (for obvious reasons). Asked how he feels after killing an innocent civilian, the provo said: "Afterward, I think, I didn't want to do that - but it had to be done. You know, at times, it does wear you down. At times, you want to stop because it's too much. You have to say to your comrades, 'I need to think, to get away from the shooting!' And you go to a friendly house and sit for a week and think.

"I believe that if I continued to do what I'm doing and didn't have doubts, I'd have a problem. To stop every now and then and think, 'Now, where is this taking

me? What have I achieved? But just to go on, no holds barred, saying, 'I am right, I am right' - then it's a problem."

Of course you might argue that the provo is lying - that he doesn't really mean this, and only says it because he knows people will respond to it. But it's interesting to me that the sentiment he expresses is exactly the one that Mr. Stabosz insists that terrorists don't ever feel.

I noted with interest your mention (in #106, I think) that "Americans have always been quite fond of their system of 'checks and balances.'" You're showing atypical generosity toward us Americans, aren't you? I was sure you'd claim the system for the French.

[Your whole reference to the U.S. setting out to sort out the problems of Latin America, East Europe and the Middle East is exactly the sort of hype that is so objectionable to many foreigners, and firmly espoused not just by some "official line" but also by the average man in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles streets. Look it, don't do the rest of the world any more favours, OK?

[It's amusing that your definition of tolerance includes only "true liberals", and by implication excludes conservatives: in itself a rather intolerant statement to make, but hey, quite typical of the bleeding heart liberal "holier-than-thou" attitude.]

From Brent McKee (Canada): Thank you first of all for sending the copy of #105 that you apparently missed sending me when you were sending out 'zines in the first place. Thought provoking as always.

Especially given what else was inside that envelope. Issue #107 came as a shock, and I don't mean that as a figure of speech. Given that you had offered subscription credit in #105, I can only conclude that the decision to fold was a snap one motivated by ??? Perhaps it is best to say that you just found something better/more enjoyable/more important/more pressing to do with your time and/or money.

Okay, you said spare the condolences, but I can't help it. You or at least Passchendaele will be a missed old spanning partner of mine. Hopefully you (personally rather than as a publisher) will keep some degree of involvement in the hobby, provoking thoughts and sudden increases in blood pressure levels. Another thing that will be missed is the people who were a part of Passchendaele. As much as you, and they, sometimes irritated me it was always a pleasure having you in my life.

I had a great deal more to say. For example, I would like to refute your contention that a republican form of government is better than a monarchical form with a British style Parliament. Put simply, in our current system, ministers are responsible to the elected representatives of the people. They are subject to almost daily questioning and if their responses are inadequate they may be forced out of office. Try doing that in the United States. Just look how long James Watt managed to stay on. Consider too the case of a President whose policies are so disliked by Congress that so very little of his legislative program makes it through, while the actions approved by Congress are routinely vetoed. Paralysis, far greater than could occur in Canada, would result.

I would also like to comment on your discussion of the Canadian Constitution. The intention of that document was to give supremacy to the federal government in light of the events of the U.S. Civil War which were a direct result of their federal level's comparative weakness. Part of the problem in the following years came because while provincial powers were explicitly spelled out, so were the federal powers: consequently when new situations arose, like Medicare, the provinces made their own grabs for power in those areas, and deals had to be made and enshrined in the Constitution. The federal power of disallowance can still be used and has been used, most notably in 1935 in Alberta, but only in cases where a provincial action is so clearly outside the realm of provincial powers and so clearly within the realm of federal powers that it is obvious. In the Alberta case it was the attempt by that province to issue its own money without federal approval. Similarly the Governor-General might refuse to dissolve Parliament at the Prime Minister's request if the government has so slim a minority that he cannot govern and is seeking to dissolve Parliament immediately after opening it in an effort to avoid defeat. Byng was

night, even though it cost him his career, and King was dead wrong.

As I say, there are a lot of things like these that I would like to discuss with you which I won't be able to now. Passchendaele is most sincerely going to be missed.

[Your remarks may have drawn much too close of a link between monarchies and parliamentary democracies. There are plenty of republican examples where the ministers are responsible to the elected representatives of the people: Israel, India, Germany, Italy. These are all instances of systems where the cabinet cannot survive without the support of the legislative assembly, but there are many other examples where the legislature can bring formidable pressure to bear upon the executive in many other ways: France, Russia, and yes, the United States (where each Cabinet appointment must be approved by Congress, and where impeachment procedures are in place). By contrast, there are also plenty of examples of monarchies that could exercise vast executive powers with or without a Cabinet regardless of the wishes of their parliaments, starting with the Tudor dynasty but including more recent ones such as Germany, Italy and Japan.

[James Watt managed to stay on in the United States for very much the same reasons that Shirley Martel of the NDP has in Ontario (a constitutional monarchy) - they were both able to count on the support of enough legislators together with that of their boss. Under your horror scenarios, a Congress that found a presidential program abhorrent could override White House vetoes and push its own agenda forward. At any rate, the countries perhaps best known today for legislative gridlock would have to be Japan and Italy, where in both cases parliament and Cabinet operate much along British lines.]

From Mark Lew (U.S.): Some of my subscribers are telling me I'm going to have to help make up for Passchendaele's absence. Yikes.

From Ron Cameron (U.S.): You won the Rod Walker 1990 Award - a tie with Larry Botimer. Well deserved, if you'll take yet another compliment from me. And, in your wildest dreams you'd never even guess who voted for you. If he hadn't there would have been no tie.

Come back to the hobby, Mr. Cuennier. You're missed. How about a "special issue"? I'll split the cost with you!

From Brent McKee (Canada): [...]

The Canadian 'zine scene is pretty rocky. Excelsion folded but may be back. Bruce eventually got to be well beloved by subscribers and reviewers. Worse (in a way), Diplodocus hasn't been seen in months. Pienne published only two issues in 1992. That 'zine produced a service with only a limited audience, but of some importance. I can't replace it. (You could if you wanted.)

Last I heard (Autumn 1992), Danny Collman still publishes Springboard. There's the usual discussion of whether such a thing is really needed. I recall we had the same arguments here over Tyromania.

I don't know if you heard (probably did), but Cal held the drink-off at World Diplon. With the "aid" (?) of Doug Acheson, he proceeded to drink various Aussies and Yanks under the table. Oddly, everyone of the people involved, except Cal and Brad, have pretty much dropped out of the hobby.

Substantive stuff? I am now less worried about Quebec separation than I am about the total absence of leadership in this country - Campbell, Chnétien, Manning, McLaughlin and Bouchard? Some choice! It is just as bad at the provincial level, too!

Remember (OK, so look it up) when I wrote that Germany should not rush to unify? To my mind the relationship between the old East Germany and West Germany and the people therein tends to vindicate me. At least I think so. Germany may be Europe's great power but internally it has deep problems.

Congratulations on buying a house. Money is like other commodities. "Buy Low, Sell high" still applies. I wish more people realized this.

Are we getting a kinder and gentler hobby? I don't know. You missed the Gannett Schenck period at the 'Zine Register. I wrote reviews for all three issues and spent time after the first two distancing myself from some of Gannett's statements. Issue #20 was a running attack on Cal White and Brad Wilson.

[...]

[Don't find the fact that so many hobbyists have dropped out odd. Few hang around for many more than five years regardless of their initial degree of enthusiasm unless their name is Andy Lischett, who has not taken a break since 1977.]

From Réginald de Potesta de Waleffe (Belgium): I am very happy to be receiving your Passchendaele every fifteen days [...]. Did you know that Passendale is my favourite cheese?

[...]

In regards to issue #106, I am a committed hobbyist and cannot at all understand the Bad Boys. They have no valid point: the hobby is not some money trap, I spend no more than \$20. a month on it. My hobby does not in any way interfere with my studies. It's only a question of striking the proper balance. Nor do I pretend to be some Napoleon; I haven't lost touch with reality, though some of the friends I've stabbed have! For me, Diplomacy is an intellectual challenge where we can develop all of our psychological abilities as well as an ability to see both sides of any argument. It is a game for future carpet salespeople (play Turkey!).

[...]

From Michel Liesnard (Belgium): [...]

I am a glutton. I love to cook. The most frequent comment from my neighbours is, "But, Mr. Liesnard, what is it that smells so good in your house?" I have even tried Aztec recipes (including a stew of frog legs) and Babylonian recipes (sauce pates). I have been a cook on a fishing boat from Iceland. Within a week of fishing for herring, the captains of other vessels - whether English, Portuguese, Spanish or Irish - were coming over to my ship to try out my preparations. [...] These brave seawolves had picked out a nickname for me, "the Kitchen Wizard". It is true that, to paraphrase Napoleon, cooking is an art that lies entirely in the execution.

To each his own. Our upstairs neighbour, Alexis, is completely helpless in the kitchen. The recipe for hard boiled eggs is taped to the door of his fridge. But he is an exceptional model builder, so he decorates my window sills with miniature fighters and bombers while I keep him supplied with lasagnas and roasted chicken.

My extensive stay with the Iranians (I was their official embassy translator in Brussels from 1977 to 1985) made their life miserable. How could one of the greatest civilizations in History fall so low as to prohibit music, chess as well as any culinary refinement, all in the name of a derisive masochism? "We are on earth to expiate." Expiate what? The Original Sin? The drinking problems of Noah or King David? The errors of the American Satan? The martyr of Hussein? Why must they stomp on flowers as they whip themselves? Why did they prohibit me from giving leftovers to birds or stray cats, on the grounds that there are famines in the Sudan or in Ethiopia? [...]

When I was a little kid, I lived in the Belgian Congo. I have never appreciated the paternalistic colonialism of Belgium. In fact, my mother was treated like something of a black sheep because she liked to work instead of getting her niggers to serve her cocktails. But I can truthfully state that the condition of the average African was better then than it is under the maniacal dictatorship of Mobutu. In Matadi, my home town, there were twelve schools, four hospitals and almost 100,000 inhabitants - now only a few bawdy houses and a ghetto remain.

[...]

Back to cooking: there was an idiotic law, in the Belgium Congo, reserving all potatoes for the Whites, while the Congolese were only given rice. When a freighter with a full potato shipment was sunk, we were without fries for two months. We could have been given rice to balance our diet, but that stuff was just for the underclass. Hatred is not a respectable feeling, but I hate all bigots.

From Robert Jewett (U.S.): I am very sorry about the folding of your 'zine. I much enjoyed reading it and had several articles to contribute. I can fully appreciate the cost,

and the drain on your free time. I do not publish, and still my wife begrudges me the time I spend on gaming. I figure that a game lasts 20 seasons. Canadian postage costs \$0.45 a shot, so that is \$9.00 per player, disallowing any separation of seasons. Since you charged only \$3. for the game, the marginal break-even point is six dollars higher than what we paid. Therefore, I will send you another six bucks, as it is only fair. I would have thought that your 'zine would have had seven or eight hundred paying subscribers.

[800 subscribers x \$6.00 loss = \$4,800.? Perish the thought...!]

From Réginald de Potesta de Waleffe (Belgium): I cannot conceal my surprise, and was devastated to read of your fold in Passchendaele #107. I was very saddened, but in the end you alone can decide your future. [...] I had placed so much hope on your 'zine. A 'zine that leaves the hobby and dies is a little as though a bit of us all had died.

I am all the more saddened by the fact that yours was my only Canadian subscription, so I will no longer be receiving envelopes covered with Canadian postage.

[...]

From Xavier Blanchot (France): [...] I have some terrible regrets. I have never been given the chance to read the Diplomacy World of Rod Walker, nor the Chartecler of Michel Liesnard, nor the Europa Express of Gary Coughlan - and now, I will not get to read any more Passchendaeles from François Cuennien. Sob!

[...]

[It might just be that some publishers fold just to get all the posthumous praise!]

From Michel Liesnard (Belgium): I am very saddened by your decision to let go of Passchendaele, but this is not a criticism as I did the same with Chartecler.

Nonetheless. If you choose to publish an ultimate issue, we would like to know of the exact reasons. #107 was a little too brutal in its silence, if you get my meaning.

To move on, you have again published some nonsense recently. Andorra is not an episcopal principality. By tradition, the co-princes of Andorra are the Bishop of Urgel (in Spain) and the President of the French Republic (heir to the throne). But the real power is in the hands of the Council of Valleys, an elected parliament.

Further, Andorra is not Basque but rather, Catalan. Its official language is Catalan, which had been forbidden under Franco but which has been resurrected since the return of Spain to democracy.

Catalan is a romane language and Basque is... a Basque language, of unknown origin, and with some links to some dialects from western Africa. Probably it was the tongue spoken by the populations of western Europe before the arrival of Judeo-European civilization, notably, the Celts. [...] The Basques call their country "Euzkadi", while the Romans referred to them as "Vascones" (note the permanence of the consonants), which led to the word "Gascons" in French. Edmond Rostand immortalized them in his play, "Cyrano de Bergerac" [...]. Charles of Baatz, Lord of Antagnan, who really existed, was a Cadet from Gasconne. It was he who arrested Fouquet, giving rise to the legend of the "Iron Mark". He became Marshall of France and died at the Siege of Maastricht in 1673. The last Kings of France were of Basque origin, as descendants to Henry IV, King of Navarra. [...] Among other things, the Basques have invented squash. [...]

Last Sunday, Flemish nationalists marched on Brussels to demand that French be banned. This is scary. If someone speaks Arabic or Mandarin Chinese, he is welcomed in Flanders. But if he speaks French, he must be punished. French is the "dirty language" of sex, freedom of thought, and of those-who-disobey-the-Church.

I speak French, with height of 1m82 and weight of 120kg. I am not some fatso stuffed with mayonnaise, but rather am a muscular man. I am very good at fencing, sailing, flying, horseback riding, hunting... and I know how to fight. When the Inarians of Brussels attacked us in the street, my lady and I, they all ended up in the hospital. It is very dangerous

to attack a pacifist Liesnard...

For this Summer, we have rented a 18m sailboat. We will cruise the Mediterranean up to Crete. I have been dreaming of the palaces of Cronos for years. We would have gone all the way to Alexandria if it had not been for the "Silco" incident. Winston has no intention of becoming the first cat hostage to Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council.

We will stop over at Chena, probable location of Atlantis before the gigantic volcanic eruption of the XVIIth Century B.C. (fourteen times as powerful as that of the Krakatoa in 1883), which destroyed the minocene civilization and gave rise to the legends of the "Plights of Egypt".

We have had big problems with our King recently. Our Parliament, after a free and democratic debate, had voted to partially decriminalize abortion. The King refused to give Royal Assent, explaining clearly that he could not personally do so in good conscience. It was necessary to declare the King unfit to rule for a period of 36 hours so that the Cabinet could have the authority to proclaim the bill against his wishes. The King - of whom no one questions the honesty, or expects him to compromise his own conscience - has committed a big snafu. By departing from his role as incarnation of the nation, he cut himself off from his people. He has stopped being the King of Belgians to become the

King of the Catholic Flemish. The man is respectable, and his life has not been easy - having lost his mother at 5, been taken prisoner and then deported between the ages of 10 and 15, heir to his father at 20 in a climate of civil war, incapable of begetting a child. The respect bestowed him is unanimous. But it is he who has not respected the will of the people, clearly expressed through the vote of the Houses, in this way voting himself even though this is not permitted in our monarchs.

Beyond this, I have another criticism to make of my King. He appears to be completely deaf to anything pertaining to the Arts. We can see him any time the subject is industry or commerce [...], but never in a museum, at a concert or at a show.

I am a little scared because the Crown Prince, Philip, nephew of the King, has the same flaws. The kid hops from commando regiments to fighter squadrons but has for Art the interest that a fish might exhibit for an apple. I suppose that it is very difficult to sleep well with a violin in the same bed, but must they be so loving of grand assemblies?

If, one day, you go through Brussels, do not hesitate to ring us up. "Richel-du-Sublime-Met" (sci-fi fans have nicknamed me so) loves to cook for his pals. I will serve you the fruit alcohol that my grandfather distills under the belief that the gendarmes do not know, even though in reality they all line up at his door. We will also prepare some "moambe", the national dish of Zaire, consisting of roasted chicken stirred in pulp and served with tree leaves and "pili pili" sauce. Pili-pili (from the Arabic "felfel" for pepper) is a red pepper related to dynamite, TNT and the Hun invasions. Next to pili-pili, Cayenne pepper is without flavour, torpedoes are toys, and Perchlorhydric Acid has the pH of water. When I was a little kid in Africa, I loved to eat with Domingo, an Angolese who mounted the guard in front of our house. I hunted quail with my pellet rifle, he feathered them, and we flavoured them in an incendiary sauce.

Domingo is old today. My family of "infamous colonialists" paid for the studies of his three sons: two engineers and one language professor. He lives nearby, and sometimes we still party together.

You see, Mensch, there are some who still write you even though you will no longer publish. [...] It is 2:30 A.M., so I will cut myself a thick slice of Passendale cheese spread on crackers. Be happy!

[Can't a country run, if nominally, by a bishop be referred to as an episcopal principality, even if the power is shared?

[There is no doubt that all of Black Africa is in dire straits. In fact, it is the only region on earth to have lost purchasing power in the last two decades. Everywhere else G.D.P. has grown in real terms. Of course, no one agrees why. Many blame the petty dictatorships and the tribal warfare, and it is quite true that civil wars do tend to take on the dimensions of genocides. But some still blame the western powers, for not preparing the continent for self-rule, and for their interventions in local politics (using corruption usually, but also troops where it fails to work) to further their own interests. I would personally believe that the Blacks are responsible for their own circumstances, but that certainly the Whites have hardly been any help.]

THE NEW WORLD ORDER



Back to the future

A strong America, an advancing China, a struggling Russia and an uncertain Europe make up the new quartet of big powers. The interplay of their interests and the threat of proliferation will fix the rudiments of the next world order

SO THERE is to be no new world order after all, says a chorus of disappointed voices as the curtain rises for 1994 on a scene of disorder in Russia, betrayal in Bosnia, terrorism in North Africa and nuclear poker-playing in North Korea. The voices are wrong. With one necessary proviso—that mankind avoids a new form of anarchy—there is going to be a new world order. It may not be the one you would have liked, or were hoping for after the defeat of communism and the slapping down of Saddam Hussein. But a reordering of the world's pattern of power, a new configuration of strong and weak, is almost certainly on the way.

Each period of history has produced its own pattern of relations, settled or otherwise, among the world's powers. It might be a near-monopoly, as the Roman empire was in the corner of the world the Romans knew, and the Middle Kingdom was for the Chi-

nese until 150 years ago. (There has not yet been a near-monopoly in the real, whole world.) It might be a duopoly, as was more or less the case in the cold war, though duopolies seldom last long: when one side starts to get the better of the other, number two has nowhere to turn for help.

More usually, the order emerges from the interplay of three, four or five powers which create a shifting pattern of alliances and enmities among themselves. This is the dance of the dinosaurs. It is the way things were in most of Europe and Asia—the core of the historical world—for most of the time in the past few centuries, until 1945; and it is the way things are likely to be again now.

The new order may be more durable than earlier ones, or less durable; it may be sturdy, or wobbly; it may be kindly, or brutal. Most of its component parts may be democracies, or only a minority of them. But

unless something happens to prevent any sort of order arising—which is to say unless anarchy takes over—a new world order is not something to be wished for or wished away. It is the next arrival on the conveyor-belt of history.

The four powers fairly certain to take part in the new pattern are the United States, China, Russia and Europe, in that order of probability. Then come two merely possible contenders: one is Japan, the other a hypothetical centre of power in the Muslim world (which, if it did come into being, could prove the most explosive of the lot).

Nobody else seems to qualify. It is unlikely that Africa or the Antipodes is going to produce a member of this dominant group. Latin America, even big Brazil, will probably stay under the eagle's wing of the United States for at least the next decade or two. India will be a power in its own neighbourhood but its frail economy and its physical isolation between the Himalayas and the sea will almost certainly keep it out of the global competition. The only big question-mark—the joker in the pack, the possible bringer of anarchy—is the proliferation factor: the danger that an unknown number of countries with no other claim to great power may prove able to equip themselves with nuclear or biological weapons of mass destruction, deliverable at a distance.

Two questions to ask

To work out the various shapes the new pattern may take, it helps to ask two questions about the handful of big powers. The first is the up-or-down question. It is not hard to estimate the weight of the big powers in their relations with one another over the next few years—say, up to 2000. But how might those weights increase or diminish in the early part of the 21st century, and in response to what factors? Second, there is the who-with-whom question. On present evidence, which big powers are most likely to team up with one another, and which to go on glaring at each other?

As things stand now, the United States wields by far the most weight. Its economy is by the purchasing-power test roughly the same size as that of Western Europe (but Europe's is flagging), 260% the size of China's and 630% the size of poor Russia's. As a military power it is in a category of its own, not so much because of its nuclear weapons as because it is streets ahead of everybody else in its ability to use satellites, computers and stealth technology to aim ordinary, non-nuclear weapons with overwhelming precision. And, unlike the self-styled European Union (ex-European Community), Amer-

ica has a government capable of taking reasonably clear-cut decisions. It is not the world's "superpower" in the sense of having enough power to override everyone else, but it is manifestly *primus inter pares*.

Americans can hold on to this advantage for a while yet, if they want to. Their lead in military technology will probably go on growing for the next decade or more. Their economy has problems, but it is no longer fashionable to think that these are severe enough to paralyse American power.

The only thing which might bring about that paralysis is the Americans themselves. They, unlike the inhabitants of the Eurasian land-mass (who include all three of America's chief competitors), have an option of comfortable semi-retirement, of withdrawal into the cosy near-self-sufficiency of the Americas. They have shown a distinct interest in this option since the end of the cold war. If, at the close of the 20th century, it seems hard to believe that America might tiptoe out of the world, it is worth remembering that, at the start of the century, it was hard to imagine America tiptoeing in.

If Americans resist the temptation to withdraw, there is only one serious question to be asked about their side of the who-with-whom business. They will keep up their links with Europe, which is closest to them in political beliefs and practical interests. They are unlikely to make an ally of China, the power furthest from them on both those counts. The question is about Russia.

Many Americans are attracted by the idea of a Russia-America axis as the centre of a new world order, and are prepared to buy Russia's co-operation by giving it a free hand in the former Soviet Union. (One version of the idea appears in an article in the current issue of *Foreign Policy* by its editor, Charles William Maynes.) There would be obvious problems. What would Europe think of letting Russian power seep back to the borders of Poland and Hungary? How could you make sure the seepage stopped there? But for Americans who want to stay involved in the world and yet to ration the amount of effort they need to put into it, a Russia-America axis has its appeal.

If America is the power with the widest range of choices, the narrowest belongs to Europe. The Europeans have not yet launched any coherent attack on the social costs that are weakening the competitiveness of their economies. They show no wish to spend the extra 2-3% of GDP per year needed to bring their armed forces anywhere near American levels of computer-and-satellite efficiency. Above all, it now seems clear that there will be no single European state with a coherent European foreign policy until well into the next century—if then. On the up-and-down scale, Europe is tilting down.

Europe also has the shortest list of prospective friends. Four years ago, after the fall

of the Berlin Wall, there were Europeans who thought the time had at last come for an Atlantic-to-the-Urals deal with Russia. That idea looks a lot less attractive now that Russia seems condemned to a long period of political and economic turmoil; and Europeans would have difficulty in offering Russia the incentive—a resumption of control over the ex-Soviet Union—that some Americans are willing to offer for their own special relationship with Russia. A Europe-China axis is even more unlikely.

The Europeans' choice is stark. They can work with America in a new, outward-looking version of the Atlantic alliance, or they

That still gives Russia an edge.

Of the four main powers, the most indisputably upwardly-mobile is China. Even if the Chinese economy cannot sustain its 12-13% growth rate of the past two years, it promises to go on performing formidably well. This will before very long enable China to add a modern army, navy and air force to its existing nuclear armoury. In terms of world power, the measure of a country's economic success is not GDP per head (which for China's 1.2 billion people is bound to stay small for many years); rather, it is the ability to build up armed strength and to hearten the men who carry the guns with the confidence that their country is going up in the world. China has both those things within its grasp.


Enter the dragon

China may start to use its new self-confidence sooner than expected. On December 26th its prime minister said openly that, if America called for economic sanctions to prevent North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons, China would block the use of sanctions. The Chinese did not say this because they want a nuclear-armed Kim Il Sung; they must find that prospect as horrifying as everybody else does. They said it because they want to show they have the power to say No to the United States.

China's emergence could have a dramatic effect on the pattern of power. The Chinese believe that several of their neighbours—including Russia—sit on territory which really belongs to China. The present government in Beijing sees its adaptation of communism as a rival of the democracy to which most other countries now give at least lip-service. Even if that changes, and China goes democratic, it will still want to be the chief power in Asia, and one without whose consent America and Russia and Europe can do nothing important in that half of the world. At best it will be a lumberingly uncooperative partner in the dance of the powers; at worst, the disrupter who breaks up the whole dance.

So much for the four principals: on to the two long shots. Japan ranks among them, despite its stunning wealth, because it will have trouble converting its splendidly high GDP-per-head into the more brutal currencies of international power. It is a small, vulnerable island lying between two great powers neither of which wishes to see it build up any very great armed strength.

The Chinese do not want an East Asian military competitor. The Americans would like some Japanese help in peacekeeping operations around the world, but would rather that they themselves remained the chief non-Chinese military power in Asia. There is no overwhelming demand for Japanese rearmament within Japan itself, and none at all from the smaller countries of the region—which makes Japan different from



can drift off alone and wait for the squalls to hit them. The NATO summit on January 10th may start to show which decision Europe will take.

Russia, on the face of it, looks better off; but appearances can be deceptive. Does Boris Yeltsin really hope for an alliance with America, and the global condominium that implies? Perhaps he does; but the odds are that even a half-confident America will come to see that such an arrangement is liable to be more trouble (in the resentment it causes elsewhere) than it is worth to America. It is just as hard to picture a coming together of Russia and the European Union, unless Europe is abandoned by America and has to accept Russia's terms. A new Russia-China alliance is almost inconceivable.

The hard fact is that no power is going to risk very much in its relations with Russia so long as that country's downward plunge goes on. On the up-down calculation, Russia's economic performance is much the worst of the big four. This has already weakened its armed forces, and will weaken them still further. Nor has Russia yet found the degree of political consensus needed to avoid continuing disorder and perhaps even disintegration. Russia's hope of being a force in the world ever again might seem even dimmer than Europe's, except for one thing. When Russians look westward into Europe, they feel envious; when Europeans look eastward to Russia, they feel nervous.

Germany, whose fellow Europeans urged it to rear up 40 years ago. Unless these things change, Japan will stay economically big but militarily small. And a rueful look through history shows that a loaded gun generally counts for more than a fat purse.

The other long shot, an Islamic power, may never come into existence; but, if it did, it would doubtless give the gun priority over the purse. A new state created out of countries in the western part of the Muslim world, professing the principles of Islam, would have a clear-cut ideology in open competition with that of the modern West. If most of its people were Arabs, it would possess the further unifying force of a shared language. And it would have the power of oil, which could be denied to its adversaries or sold for buying the weapons with which to fight them.

This pugnacious new arrival would confront two ready-made enemies. One would be Europe, its centuries-old quarrel with western Islam still liable to flare up over places like Bosnia. Then would come Russia, whose border with Islam in central Asia remains a blur. It is by no means impossible that a new Islamic power would get into a fight with both Europe and Russia—and, if it did, it might look for an ally to China, which also has a border quarrel with Russia.

Finally, the joker: the proliferation factor. Proliferation could make it irrelevant to talk about any kind of order at all. If nuclear or biological weapons came into the possession of a half-dozen more countries—or a dozen more, or two dozen—any hope of a rule-governed world would almost certainly vanish.

Most of these new masters of mass destruction would have foreign-policy agendas of their own, which they could pursue without much fear of dissuasion by the countries that had once been the "big powers". The necessary bargaining and manoeuvring between America, China, Russia and Europe, which was hazardous enough before, would become impossibly complicated if each had to take this array of new missile-wielders into all its calculations. The world order would no longer be a delicate dance of four or five, but the stomping of a platoon's-worth of powers. As 1994 opens, it is a sombre thought that the outcome of the present argument with North Korea may decide whether or not the scene is about to be thus transformed.

The likeliest possibilities

So what are the likely patterns of this uneasy new world? There are many possible combinations and permutations, but several of them look pretty theoretical. (A Europe-China alliance to keep middle-man Russia under control? Hardly. A pairing of young America and China to keep oldsters Europe and Russia in their place? No.)

Let it be rather hopefully assumed that

no mass proliferation of nuclear weapons takes place. Let it also be assumed, a little more confidently, that America stays engaged in the world, Russia stays wobbly but in one piece, and Europe fails to unite into a single state. In these circumstances, there are two main possibilities.

One is what will probably take place if China's arrival on the world-power stage happens soon and spectacularly, meaning within the next five or ten years and with an authoritarian Chinese government bent on carving out a place in the world for "socialism with Chinese characteristics". This will alarm next-door Russia, which occupies a large amount of territory taken from China 130-odd years ago.

The Russians, wanting the support of America and Europe against this new problem to the east, will become much more co-operative towards the West in foreign policy. Europe and America, also anxious about China, will be readier to help Russia without insisting very vigorously on Russian progress towards democracy and economic efficiency. The upshot will probably be a loose-wristed three-power alliance for the containment of China, while Japan—intimidated by China's growing power, and needing America's protection—stays modestly at sub-great-power level.

An explosive variant would be provided by the appearance of that new Islamic power. Fear of this would push Europe and Russia closer together. But the Islamic power might well find a natural ally in China, because China would share its dislike of Russia and would be a very practical partner in an exchange of oil for modern weapons. That combination would threaten Russia on two fronts, and the result could quite possibly be Russia's collapse. If you were looking for an apocalyptic scenario, this would be a candidate.

The kindlier—and, on the whole, likelier—alternative will prevail if China remains relatively unassertive and the new Islamic power never comes into being. Russia, free from external threat, will be able to concentrate on its long and difficult struggle towards a modern economy and a liberal political system. Russia would, in this case, be neither a formal ally nor an open adversary of Europe and America, just a prickly acquaintance emitting occasional cries of pain or rage.

A relatively mild China and a self-absorbed Russia would then give America and Europe, if they decided to work together, an opportunity to share the responsibilities of predominant power over the next two or three decades—not just in pursuit of their own interests, but also because they genuinely had something to offer the world.

Does it sound familiar? This was the opportunity many people thought had arrived a couple of Januaries ago, after the formal collapse of the Soviet Union. The defeat

of communism, followed by the defeat of Saddam Hussein, appeared to be ushering the Atlantic democracies into one of those rare periods of history when a lucky group of people finds itself possessed of a good idea, military strength and self-assurance all at the same time. But then the prospect seemed to fade, as the democracies failed to cope with the crises that hit them one-two-three in ex-Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti. Their performance in these three hard tests diminished the West in the world's estimation, and in its own.

But perhaps these disappointments were, in fact, no more than an uncommonly bumpy stretch of a much longer and generally smoother road. Perhaps Europe and America can now pull themselves together, literally and figuratively, for another attempt to seize the opportunity still lying ahead of them.

For they are, after all, the originators of the political idea that comes closest to exercising universal appeal in the modern world: democracy. People everywhere want the chance to eject bad or unpopular rulers peaceably from power. The machinery for that ejection may vary greatly from country to country. But the argument you hear from authoritarian politicians in East Asia and elsewhere—that their people do not want the power to eject, because they trust their rulers to rule them well—is self-serving nonsense. Nobody trusts the boss to be permanently perfect. Europe and America invented the idea that there should be an orderly way of getting rid of the boss who goes wrong. They can help to spread that idea wider, if they wish to do so.

Do they? The spreading of democracy—its "enlargement", in the Clinton administration's word—requires constant effort. It costs money and sometimes lives. The question is whether Europe and America can re-discover the will to make that effort. On the answer to that, the eventual shape of the new world order may depend.



THE NANNY STATE

Victory! For years, if not decades, the mandarins at every level of government in Canada had taken the taxpayer for granted, and thought that they could just torture the goose who laid the golden eggs. In addition, there was some advocacy for "social engineering" as well, that is, the use of taxation to discourage behaviour. Thus, the official line behind the so-called "sin taxes" had been that they could be implemented to generate revenue for the government (becoming in time a real gold mine) while forcing people to cut down or stop smoking. After all, the bureaucrats explained, smokers were the very ones who drove health care expenses so high.

They got away with it for a long time, until Canadians decided to put their foot down and shout, "Enough!" Instead of falling in line, smokers everywhere resorted instead to contraband cigarettes imported into the country primarily by Indian bands. When government realized that it was losing fully 75% of potential revenues to this illicit trading, it buckled under in February and reduced taxes considerably. About time. Good for them. And good for us.

CARTON OF CIGARETTES

	Before Tax Cut	After Tax Cut
P.S.T.	\$2.85	\$1.50
G.S.T.	2.50	1.40
Wholesaler/Retailer	3.29	1.84
Ontario Tobacco Tax	13.00	3.40
Federal Excise Tax	5.36	0.76
Federal Excise Duty	5.50	5.50
Manufacturer	<u>8.50</u>	<u>8.50</u>
TOTAL	\$41.00	\$23.00

[The average total cost of a carton in the United States amounts to about \$13.-14.]

GREAT WHITE NORTH

As constitutional gridlock set in, support for sovereignty swelled in Quebec, leading to the election in 1993 of a large contingent of separatists to the House of Commons. Some in the rest of the country responded with a shrug, in effect saying "let them go". This is partly the result of constitutional fatigue: after three decades of wrangling, Canadians want a rest from it all, and in these difficult economic circumstances the employment issue is regarded as far more important (11% of the workforce being on the dole currently). There's also some of the old smugness, the view that holds Quebec as not out of quite the right cloth to go it alone. Mainstream thought about the province is that it has had it good and could stand a lot to lose by leaving - and that at any rate Canada would certainly drive a hard bargain (and about time, too).

Majority opinion in Quebec is quite different - certainly the voters believe that they've acquired their prosperity through their own sweat and tears and not because of any hand-out. The federal government may run some projects in the province, but it is their taxes that pay for them,

so separation goes more to the issue of who will supply the services rather than whether they will continue to be offered at all. Moreover, the general feeling is that in several instances Canada would be cutting its nose to spite its face if it moved to harm a sovereign Quebec.

The following survey of potential disputes to arise under a hypothetical separation scenario underlines just how far apart the two outlooks are:

§ territorial issues - Canadians would like to reclaim all the land given Quebec since 1760 because these acquisitions were made as a province, not a sovereign nation, and were therefore not governed by international treaty. This would leave the new state with less than a third of its current land mass, or just a stretch of land on both sides of the St. Lawrence River. The sea boundary could also become a serious bone of contention since application of a strict 200-mile limit between Newfoundland and Nova Scotia could result in complete blockage of the Gulf, the only sea access to Quebec. But international jurisprudence appears to favour Quebec on both counts, as it recognizes the importance of demographic occupation, the desire of the local population, and precedent in awarding territory. The laws of the sea have also been drafted with the express intention of preventing the effective landlocking of any country, no matter how strange the final partition may look on a map, as was the case of the recent St. Pierre and Miquelon judgment.

§ foreign investment - international confidence would no doubt become more timid until the two parties approached a settlement on the bigger issues, but note how this would affect both economies albeit perhaps to different extents. The big concern here is the reaction of Canadian investors, though Quebecers believe that money knows no borders: investors spend money depending on whether it makes good business sense, not out of some sense of philanthropy. If they start turning down good deals out of a sense of outraged, and in this world, misplaced, patriotism, they'll be hurting themselves more than they do Quebec as this would simply "open the door" to foreign speculators. In some regards, Quebec has already paid the price of independence since the proportion of Canadian investment has fallen steadily over the last twenty years, whether over language or the threat of independence, in the process merely leaving more room for the francophone natives as well as the Americans.

§ trade - currently much of Quebec's production is for export to Ontario, just as the reverse also applies to Ontario, although the biggest customer of either is the United States. The majority in Canada still thinks that a boycott would hurt the separatists a lot, as no doubt it would. This attitude ignores the fact, though, that retaliation would also be damaging to Canada, and it shows a lack of understanding for the basic economic fact that in any transaction both the vendor and the buyer benefit. The corollary of this, of course, is that both the vendor and the buyer stand to lose from the cancellation of a transaction for non-business reasons.

§ federal assets and debt - the proportion of Canadians who still firmly believe that Quebec would lose big if forced to accept its share of the federal debt, and when forced to purchase back all the federal assets in Quebec, is somewhat astonishing. The fact that

Quebec has paid taxes to cover the cost of these assets, and that it will be paying towards its proportionate share of the federal debt for as long as it pays taxes to Ottawa anyway, is completely overlooked. Quebec has paid a percentage of total taxes roughly equal to its percentage of the population, currently at 25%, so it should probably assume roughly 25% of the debt and 25% of the assets, corresponding to roughly the federal infrastructure currently in the province. This may sound simple, but it will likely turn out to be just as acrimonious as the division of the family furniture by the typical divorcing couple. At a personal level, there would probably be a lot of dislocation and tragedy: imagine the plight of the francophone civil servant in Vancouver, given the choice of a transfer to the Quebec government or a lay-off, or the chaos after a whole federal department has just lost its headquarters because they were located on the wrong side of the border.

\$ currency - Canadians firmly believe that the confidence of the international community would be very low as Quebec attempted to set up its own national currency, making any transition to independence rather difficult. They forget that the separatists intend to continue using the federal currency, and that nothing can realistically be done about that. Canadian currency is sold on the stockmarket to any and all comers. Individuals can currently buy U.S. dollars at any bank at all - they are never required to fill out an application, present a passport, report to the U.S. Embassy, or obtain any sort of approval. Quebecers currently have bank accounts full of Canadian dollars which cannot suddenly be taken away, so it is unclear just how Canada would proceed to stop transactions in Canadian dollars. Nor is it clear why they would even want to in the first place: how else would Canadians want to be paid back by Quebec for its share of the federal debt, if not in Canadian dollars? Would they be happier with Quebec rubles?

\$ electricity from Labrador - another suggestion has been for Newfoundland to cut off the power from Churchill Falls, currently purchased by Quebec at extremely cheap contractual rates for resale to New York at a very hefty, indecent, profit. But any look at a map would show Canada to be depending upon Quebec in this instance, since the only land route available goes through Quebec. And you can't transport hydro-electric power any other way - not by ship, not by plane. The new state could actually demand even lower rates, cutting off access to its power lines to prove its point.

Nor is this the only ace in Quebec's hand. There's the land link between the Maritimes and Ontario which could be conveniently sealed off. Worse yet is the fact that Ontario's lifeline to most of its commercial markets passes through, and would be at the mercy of, the new state.

Clearly no one stands to profit from spite, particularly when both parties can play at that game. In the above instances, it is doubtful whether Quebec would really pursue a policy of brinkmanship as a first choice, but don't be fooled into thinking it wouldn't as a last recourse. Obviously, people can become emotional, and then things tend to get out of hand... but normally they try to remain rational, and this is what the separatists are counting on.

The ultimate argument for Canada would be the threat of war - but that takes us down the path to Yugoslavia. The Canadians are not sufficiently well armed, either numerically or technologically, to make this threat stick.

But the most powerful deterrent to such a policy would be the reaction of the international community, on which the Canadian economy depends in so many regards. In the Balkans, the Serb economy was far better prepared for war and much less dependent on international goodwill, and yet they ended up with, amongst other things, an inflation rate of 363% per month. In some regards, I would have preferred to live in Sarajevo.

QUOTES OF THE MONTH:

Some people think of the free market as a matter of concern only to businessmen. But when I came into office, one of the severest and most unfair restraints on the free market was the military draft, which is a way of compelling service from everyone rather than hiring service from those who supply it voluntarily. Thus the elimination of the draft and the introduction of a volunteer army in January 1973 were also major steps to meaningful economic freedom.

[Richard M. Nixon]

On April 29, 1970, more than 50 reporters crowded into Suffolk County Superior Court in Boston for the release of the bulky [Chappaquiddick inquest] documents. What reporters read staggered them, detonating another explosion of controversy about the case. The effort to manage inquest testimony had backfired. That Senator Kennedy had not spoken the truth about the accident was, "The only finding a jurist of integrity could make", the New Bedford Standard Times changed. That Judge Boyle had not ordered further legal process after finding Kennedy had contributed to Mary Jo Kopechne's death would lead many to conclude, "Where justice in Massachusetts is concerned, there is one door for John Doe and another for Senator Kennedy."

[Leo Damore in Senatorial Privilege.]

I had used this argument with him [Leonid Brezhnev] in pointing out how Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had gotten along well, particularly emphasizing the Roosevelt-Stalin relationship in fighting the war, because they did not allow differences on what the peace was going to be like to deter them from their main goal of defeating the Nazis.

Of course, historically, my own view is that this was a mistake - that Churchill was right in insisting that there be more discussion at that point and that we should have made some kind of a deal that would have avoided the division of Europe on the basis that it finally came out.

[Richard M. Nixon]

...a multi-layered, complex mystery that remains as baffling today as it was five years ago. [...] a case study of how a famous politician - by delays, by obfuscation, by propaganda, by all kinds of tricks and wiles - can kill somebody under mysterious circumstances and still regularly receive more than 40% of the support in presidential preference polls.

[Robert Sherrill in The Nation.]

And thus endeth Passchendaele for good.